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BENEFIT INCIDENCE ANALYSIS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
L

Introduction
Measuring benefits of govermnent expenditures across income, race and other

characteristicsof individualsis an elusive empiricalissue. As interestingand as difficult as it
is to allocate tax burdens to individuals, the profession knows even less about allocating
benefits.1 In this paper, we review the recent literature on benefit incidence and offer
suggestionsconcemningfurther research, focusing particular attention on benefit incidence in
developingcountries.
Benefit incidencestudies have a long history,but the interestin benefit incidencesurged
as a result of Robert McNamara's optimismabout the degreeto whichgovernmentspendingcan
alter the incomedistributionand living standardsof the poor in developingcountries. According
to McNamara,"Shifts in the pattems of public expenditurerepresentone of the most effective
1972,
techniquesa govenmmentpossesses to improve the conditionsof the poor" (McNamnara,
p. 17). Knowledge of benefit Incidence by income and other variables can be useful in
reallocatingpublic resources toward programs that benefit the poor.2
The literatureon benefit incidencehas three distinctperiods. In the eady literatureor pre1975, benefits are allocated to households either on a per capita basis or in proportion to the
income of the household. Both allocation mechanismsyield obviousconclusionsabout benefit
incidence. There is also a preoccupationin the early literature with allocatingthe entire budget
includingthe benefits of so-calledpure public goods, such as defense.
Aaron and McGuire(1970) attempt to reduce the inherent arbitrarinessof the allocation
of pure public good benefits to households by deriving benefit measures based on a specific
utility function. The parametersof their utility functionsuggest a strong pro-richdistributionof
benefits, at least in developed countries.
DeWulf (1975) in his review of the many early studies quite rightly criticized them for
not accountingfor different income elasticitiesfor differentpublic services and a host of other
problems. After the DeWulf critique, a second wave of benefit studies in both developedand
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developing countries turned to the allocation of expenditure made on more specific goods to
households based on micro data on household utilization of the public services. Examples
include Reynolds and Smolensky(1977) for the United States, Meerrnan (1979) for Malaysia,
and Selowsky (1979) for Colombia. The latter two studies led the research on benefits in
developingcountriesaway from very generalallocationsystemsand towardmore specificbenefit
assignmentsbased on utilizationof public services. The disaggregationof general results made
the studies of greater value to policy makers allocatingresourcesamong social goods.
The second period studies are distinguishedfrom the first period studies in three ways:
(i) use of micro data describinghouseholds' utilizationof public services to allocate the public
expenditureon particularsocial goods among households;(ii) recognitionof the irmportanceof
accurate income measurementfor households,and accountingfor the size of the household as
weil as its total incomein categorizinghouseholdsinto incomequintiles,and (iii) disaggregation
of services within a social function. For example, separate benefit incidence computations were

performedfor primary, secondaryand post secondaryeducationalspending.
We generallyagree with the direction the post-1975literaturehas taken. By not dwelling
on the entire fiscalpicture researchershave morerapidlydevelopedthe stock of knowledgeabout
specific social expendituresin developingcountries. We believe the approachsince 1975 has
great potential for informing policy choices on shiftng resources within programs to target
benefitsto the poor moreaccurately. Nonetheless,researchersstudyingdevelopingcountriesmay
need to pay extra attentionto (i) expendituresmade through off-budgetprograms such as public
enterprises,(ii) benefitshiftingespeciallyfor agriculturalprograms,(iii) differentialpublic service
quality, especially between urban and rural areas, (iv) the effects of benefits on inter- and intrafamily transfers, and (v) the effects of benefitson urban-rural migration.
In a recent third wave of benefit incidence,Gertler and Glewwe (1989), Gertler and van
der Gaag (1988), Gertler, et al. (1988), and Laraki (1989), estimateddemand curves for various
social services. Demand curves for particular population subgroups can be used to calculate
changes in welfare based measures (or compensatingvariation) of social services benefits.
Studies using welfare-basedmeasuresof benefitsfor a wide range of public functionscan yield
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valuable informationto policy makers and help target the limited resources for redistribution
toward those public services of maximumbenefit to the poor. However,these studies do not,
to date, e..fer benefit measures on the broad range of governmentservices that more traditional
benefit incidencestudies offer.
The next section of the paper reviews the methodologyof benefit incidence,followedby
a section focusing particular attention on methodologicalissues in developing countries. The
fourth section briefly examines recent empirical results on benefit incidence obtained for
developedcountries. The fifth section examinesthe empiricalresults for developingcountries,
and in the last section we present our conclusions, including recommendationsfor further
research and guidance.to researchers charged with doing benefit incidence studies within a
limited time frame.

IL

Methodology
There is some confusionin the empiricalliteratureaboutterminology,necessitatingsome

preliminaryremarks. Musgrave (1959), McLure (1974), McLureand Thirsk (1975), Meerman
(1979), DeWulf (1981), and Piggott and Whalley (1987), distinguish between expenditure
incidenceand benefit incidence. The former concept refers to the changesin relative factor and
productprices and real incomesthat result from governmentinputpurchases and the production
cf public output. Expenditure incidencedoes not explicitly account for the benefits of public
goods (McLureet al., 1975,p. 195). Benefitincidenceexaminesthe consumptionof govermment
services by income or other subgroup, and ideally would include the shifting of government
benefits and the relativeprice and real income changesdue to changesin the demandfor private
goods.3 We adopt this terminology,recognizingthat it differs from that used by some authors.
Ideally, the total benefit incidence of existing governmentprograms (the "post-fisc"
(the
equilibrium)would measure benefits relative to a counterfactualworld without govenmment
"pre-fisc" equilibrium). No research has yet established a counterfactual world, without
government. Most empirical studies of benefit incidenceallocate public expenditures,and not
consumersurplus benefits,to householdsbased on tbeir utilizationof the services. The consumer
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surplus and expenditure-basedmeasures of benefits are illustrated in Figure 1 for the case of
efficient pruvbion of the public good (at qo). The compensating variation or total benefit
measure consists of areas "A" and "B" in the graph (Aaron and McGuire, 1970; Maital, 1975;
Meerman, 1979; Hewitt, 1987; Piggott and Whalley,1987). Conventionalexpenditure-based
benefitincidencestudiestypically allocatethe expenditureon the public good among households,
representedby area "A" on the graph. Benefitsare then comparedamonghouseholdsin different
income groups or other socio-economicgroups.
On the one hand, this typical methodof measuringhousehold benefits does not consider
a number of important issues that affect benefit incidence. For exnample,it assumes that all
relativeprices and real incomesare fixed,and benefitsare not shifted,marginalbenefits are equal
to average benefits, and average cost is a good proxy for marginal benefit. These assumptions
expose the traditionalmethodologyto numerouscriticisms. Many programs,such as agricultural
programs, are designed to affect real incomes and relative prices. In addition, public transfers
to low-incomehouseholdsmay crowd out private transfers and shift benefits to the households
fonnerly makingprivate transfers(Hochmanand Rodgers, 1969;Barro, 1974, 1978;Lampman
and Smeeding, 1983;Andreoni, 1990;Cox and Jimenez, 1992). Added to these basic issues are
those sr:rounding the treatment of benefits from physical capitalexpenditures and from human
capital investmentsthat accrue to householdsm more than one time period.
On the other hand, expenditure-basedbenefit measures are more comparable to tax
burdens and to private disposable income than are compensatedvariation measures, insofar as
tax burdens and disposable income do not include the consumer surplus related to private
spending(Aaronand McGuire,p. 909; Maital,pp. 407-408). Also, total benefitmeasures require
informationabout the demand schedule for the public good and may be difficult to implement.
In any event, for many small policy changesthe total benefit and expenditure-basedapproaches
should yield similar results (Selden and Wasylenko,1992).
Despiteits limitations,we believe the expenditure-basedincidenceapproachcan provide
a useful first look at the allocation of governmentexpenditure among households. The

Figure 1
Measuring Benefits:
Average Cost Versus Total Benefit

$

B

..

A

Q
A = Total Cost
A + B = Full Consumer Benefit
(Diagam Reflects Assumption That Marginal Benefit Equals Marginal Cost)

Source: Authors
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expenditure-basedincidence approachcan be especially useful for examiningthe distributional
impact of marginal changes in the government's budget.
Benefit incidencestudiestypicailyexaminepublic expendiures by three major categories:
public spending on general goods, such as defense, public spending on specific public goods,
such as education and health care, and cash and in-kind transfers. We follow that rubric in
examining benefit incidence methods for public expenditures. We also examine below the
appropriate allocation of capital expenditure, interest payments and side payments made to
governmentofficials. We then make a number of recommendationsto help insure that future
research is as useful as possible.
General Benefits
Attribution rules for general benefits can be distinguished by whether they are (i)
rigorouslyderivedfrom assumptionsaboutpreferences(AaronandMcGuire,1970;Maital, 1973),
or (iij simply postulated (ad hoc) as intuitively appealing. Aaron and McGuiredevelop a utilitybased method to allocatethe expenditureon pure (general)public goods amonghouseholds. The
Aaron and McGuire approachrequires that utility functions be separable in public and private
goods and that the public good is consumed in equal amountsby all individuals. In addition,
their approachrequireschoosingparametersfor the utility function. The ad hoc methods, on the
other hand, allocate expenditures on pure public goods to households on the basis of their
proportionof total income or of their proportion of total population.
Both the utility-baseddistributorsand the moread hoc distributorscan lead to implausible
results. For exnample,with United States data, Maital (1973), using Aaron and McGuire's
approach, finds a strongly pro-rich incidence for general public goods.4 In another study of
expendituresin the United States, Reynoldsand Smolensky(1977)use an ad hoc allocation rule
and fmd benefits for pure public goods to be more pro-poor than even public cash transfer
programs. Moreover, Denzau and MacKay (1976) and Philpotts (1987) question Aaron and
McGuire's assumptions of separable utility in private and public goods and of all individuals
receiving the same amount of the public good. Indeed, by lumping expenditures on several
general public goods together,researchersassumethat the benefit-incomerelationshipis invariant
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among the public goods (DeWulf, 1981). Given these difficulties,many recent authors consider
the allocationof general benefits so problematicthat they exclude such goods from their studies.
Specific Benefits and Transfer Payments
There are three main methods to allocate specific benefits and transfers. The first
approach is to make ad hoc assumptiu-, about the incidence of particular programs. For
instance, agriculturalbenefits are often distributedin proportion to farm income. The second
approach is to infer the incidence from legislative intent, making a strong assumption that
benefitsflow to intendedbeneficiaries.The third, and by far the most informative,approachuses
household survey data to deternine householdmembers' utilizationof particularprograms.
Of course, allocable public expenditure may also have external (or "nonrecipient")
benefits, as when education affects general productivity and social order, as well as the
productivity of the individual receiving the education. One way of accounting for extemal
benefits is the Tax Foundation(1967)approachof treatingportionsof some specific and transfer
benefits as if they were general. However,in most cases the amountof indirectbenefits and the
allocationof these benefitsare arbitrarychoicesthat may providemisleadingmeasuresof benefit
progressivity.
Also, it is important to consider benefit shifting. As noted, public transfers crowd out
private interfamilytransfers,so that some of the benefits from new public transfeis may accrue
to private donors who may diminish their inter-familytransfers. Agriculturalprogram benefits
can also be shifted from farmers to consumersin the fonn of lower food prices or to landlords
in the form of higher demand and rents for land. In fact, Allen (1982) has shown that even
lump-sumtransferscan have large enoughrelativeprice and incomeeffectsto offset the benefits
from cash transfer programs. Most incidence studisq do not analyze benefit shift or extemal
benefits. In cases where shifting and external effects may be important, researchers should
consider a range of possible shifting and external benefit assumptions in assessing the
distributionalimpact of certain programs.
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Capital Expenditures
Many public expenditures,includinginfrastructureprojects,othercapitalspending,as wen
as current expenditures for education,provide benefits to householdsfor multiple years. Data
on government capital expenditures are generally available by function for several years, but
allocatingthe benefits of these capiti..expendituresto householdswill generallyinvolvemapping
the present value of the multi-yearbenefits to households. In an expenditure-basedframework,
one would multiply the value of the capital stock by the sum of the opportunitycost of capital
and depreciationas a proxy for capital servicesin each year. Of course, capital stock value data
are typically not available in most countries. In practice, benefit incidence studies handle
multipleperiod benefits in a variety of ways, and we reiterate several methodswhen we discuss
specific studies.5

Interest Payments
Several earlier studies incorrectly allocate government interest payments for bonds to
households as governnent benefits. Interest payments should never be treated as transfer
payments to households (Hammes and Wills, 1987), as the interest payments double-count
benefits that have already been counted in the allocation of service flows from the capital
expenditure. Some studies use interest payments as a proxy for services from capital
expenditures,however,and avoiddouble-countingby not separatelyallocatingserviceflows from
6
capital expenditures.

Rent-Seeking and Side Payments
In both developedand developingcountries,benefitscan be shiftedanddissipatedthrough
what has become known as "rent-seeking,"wherebyindividualsor groups of individualsattempt
to influence government behavior (Rowley,Tollison, and Tullock, 1988, and Mohammedand
Whalley, 1984). It appearsreasonable to subtractrent-seekingexpendituresby individualsfrom
the cost of the govenmmentgood or service to more closely approximateth- net benefit to the
individual. Data on side-paymentsis generallynot available, but researchersshould be mindfiu
that side-paymentsmay reduce the direct benefits of the program.

9

Measurement Issues
Benefit incidence analysts inevitably face a large number of problems in developing
reliablebenefit allocations. We discuss belowseveral importantmeasurementissues, such as the
unit of evaluation,the period of analysis,the groupingof householdson the basis of income and
other socio-economicvariables, and some limitationsof incidencemeasures.
Unit of Evaluation: Household or Individual.

Benefitsto individualsare the focus

of many social programs. However,the fundamentaleconomicor incomeunit is the household.
Individualstypically combinethe resources of the household,and expendituresare made either
as part of a household decision or by adults on behalf of the interests of household members.
While most studies examine ben:fit incidence among households,in some applications it is
important to bear in mind that governmentprograms can have important effects on the intrafamily distribution of resources among individuals,particularly in developing countries (see
section m, below).
Period of Analysis: Lifetime or Current Period.

Two issues--the period used to

measure income and the period over which one measuresbenefitsfrom govenmment
programsare inportant in this context. With respect to inccme,economistsgenerallyagree that permanent
or lifedme income, rather than current income, better reflects the economic position of
households.
The expendituresurvey data availablein most countries,includingthe United States, do
not permit a lifetime incidence analysis.7 8 However, DeWulf (1975) argues that a lifetime
perspective on income is theoreticaUyproblematic. hnperfections in the capital market that
preclude borrowingagainst future eamningsand the shortsigltzdnessof consumersmake the life
cycle approachto fiscal incidencenot particularlyrelevant to individualwelfare. This argument
may apply with pardcular force in developing countries given their widely-recognizedcredit
market imnperfections.
Measuringprogram benefits, that accrue over timneraises additionalresearch questions.
For instance,many studies allocateeducationalbenefits to householdsbased on the participation
of students in school. This distribution of benefits is then compared to the distribution of
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parental income. However, if educated children eventually move to higher income brackets, it
may be equally appropriate to argue that the benefits to education accrue to members of higher
income brackets (Pechman, 1972; DeWulf, 1981). Data often preclude knowing the future
income status of a given program recipient, making it difficult to assess the incidence of future
benefits from education or other programs.9

Grouping Households by Income and Other Variables. The most common grouping
of households is by income. Researchers have used both pre-fisc income (pre-tax income,
excluding transfer payments and oenefits from governnent programs), reflecting the focus on the
zero govemment counterfactual, as well as post-fisc income (adjusted for taxes, transfers and
govenunent program benefits) measures.

Numerous authors have debated the appropriate

measurement of income, and we direct the reader to the excellent discussions in Bird and DeWulf
(1973) and Smolensky, Hoyt, and Danzinger (1987). For developing countries, researchers need

to pay spacial attention to both noncash (or in-kind)income and different living costs in urban
and rural areas. Differentliving costs across urban and rural areas will make nominal income
a poor measure of the relative economic well-beingacross areas.
We feel that there should be more emphasisplaced on the use of income deciles (or at
least quintiles), as several studies use arbitraq income levels to group households. The use of
deciles facilitates both intemational comparisonsand intertemporalcomparisons, particularly
when significantinflation has occurred betweenthe analysisperiods. Another important issue
concernsadjustmentfor householdcomposition. One approachis to use household equivalence
scales (van der Gaag and Smolensky, 1982). Meernan (1979) and Selowsky (1979) use per
capita household income to construct income deciles. Both researchersalso confumed a very
weak correlation between household total income and household per capita income, so that
accounting for family size in income measures will generally yield a different ordering of
households' well-being.
Finally, in additionto income there exists a wide range of variables that one might use
to distinguish among households, including race, religion, ethnicity, tribal affiliation, age,
geographiclocation, and urban-rural location. When the data exist, we believe that it is often
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informative to disaggregate by these variables in conjunction with income, so that one might, for
instance, know the benefit incidence of health spending on the rural poor.10
Average Versus Marginal Incidence.

In many cases, policy makers are less

concemed about existing program benefits than about the incidence of marginal program benefits
(i.e., the incidence of benefits `rom an increase in the program expenditures). The marginal
beneficiary may be, for example, significantly poorer than the average existing beneficiary. For
instance, marginal students enrolled in schools of all levels may be less well-to-do than the
average student enrolled, because the well-to-do gain access first. Similarly, additional rural
health clinics are likely to be located in more remote and more impoverished areas than rural
health clinics on average. Public sewers and rural electrification are other examples of publiclyprovided goods to which households in higher income groups gain access first.
Standard benefit incidence measures only capture the average mix of beneficiaries. While
these measures may be appropriate for calculating post-fisc inequality, they may be poor guides
for policy decisions at the margin. Examining the benefit distributions of a program within a
country at successive points in time may help identify the marginal beneficiaries of the program
expansion (see Selowsky, 1979 and van de Walle, 1992). In addition, behavioral models, such
as those developed by Gertler et al., may allow the researcher to simulate the effect of smaU
policy changes on the beneficiary mix. FinaUy, more detailed institutional analyses of barriers
to participation in certain programs, as discussed below, may offer important insights into the
marginal beneficiaries of policy interventions and of expanded program expenditures.
Aggregate Measures of Progressivity.

Several researchers have followed Reynolds

and Smolensky (1977), who report pre-fisc and post-fisc Gini coefficients."1

While such

aggregate or "global" measures make comparisons of progressivity among studies more expedient,
there is clearly a loss of information as one moves from reporting the incidence results by decile
and by government program or functional expenditure category, to any aggregate measure. Thus,
we are skeptical about the practical value of aggregate measures.
Furthermore, we believe that better targeting of benefits to the poor requires the greatest
possible disaggregation of the benefit data. For instance, in the health sector it is far more usefuil
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to report benefit incidence by type of care and by health program, than to report the benefit
incidencefrom aggregatespendingon health care. The former allowsa quick assessmentof the
distributionalimpact of realocating resources within the health sector, whereas the latter only
allows one to gauge the overaUimpact of moving resourcesinto or out of the health sector.
Compt2tableGeneral Equilibrium Models
Piggott and WhaUey(1987)have analyzednet fiscal incidencefor the Australianeconomy
within a computable general equilibrium(CGE) context. The model is quite complex even
though Piggott and Whalley make many simplifyingassumptions,such as efficient provision of
public goods. The main point of their exercise is to comparethe results from a general model
that accountsfor the consumersurplus frompublic goods and for the marginalwelfare costs from
taxation to the results from a more typical case in the literature where taxes and t nefits are
simnplyallocated among households throughoutthe income distribution.
Three major points emerge from their model. First, for marginal increases in public
goods,consumer surpluseffectsfrom additionalpublic goods are minimal,but the welfareeffects
of taxes used to financethe additionalpublic goods are substantial. Second, if public goods are
substantiaUyreduced, the consumersurplus effects can be substantialand the reducedconsumer
surpluses affect low-mcome and high-incomehouseholds differentally. According to their
simulations, smaller marginal reductionsin public goods favor higher income households. A
welfare results can range from favoringhigh-income
third finding is that the general equhilibnum
households to favoring low-income households depending on their assumptions about the
elasticitiesamong substitutionof goods in the household utility functions.
The results of the general equilibriumanalysis do not bode well for reaching definitive
answers on benefit incidence or on net fiscal incidence. The sensitivity of the general
equilibriumresults to parameter specificationsof the model means that definitive answers to
benefit incidencedepend on the accurate estination of the parameters of the model. Absent
better empirical knowledgeabout functionalform and elasticityparameters,general equilibrium
models may dramatizethe weaknessesin benefit incidencestudies but the models may also not
yield precise estimnatesof fiscal incidence.
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Two Measures of Benefits for Local Public Goods
Several researchers have estimated a deinand curve for local public goods through
evidence on voter behavior or property values.12 The resulting demand curves can then be used
to derive consumer surplus measures of public good benefits. In one recent exnample,MartinezVasquez (1982) estimates a demand function for local public goods in St. Louis using crosssection data for the State of Missouri. From the demand function, he derives the marginal
benefits of local public goods, matches them with tax shares paid by individuals, and derives a
measure of the net fiscal incidence of local public goods across income and other population
groups.
Chaudry-Shah (1989) uses the capitalization of expenditures and taxes into property values
as another vehicle to measure fiscal benefits. He sets up hedonic equations and measures the
irnpact of expenditure benefits and taxes on property values in the Edmonton, Canada
metropolitan area.
Both the demand curve and capitalization methodologies have only been applied using
cross-sectional data; as the application of the methods requires that the expenditures on the good
vaty systematically with the location of the recipient. The hedonic or capitalization approach has
some further limitations in that the methodology assumes that both benefits and tax burdens are
fully capitalized into property values. Yinger (1982) using bid-rent theory has shown that
benefits will not be totaUy capitalized into property values. The less than total capitalization of
benefits implies that the hedonic method does not offer much promise for accurate estimation of
local net fiscal benefits.13

mL.

Methodological Issues Specific to Developing Countries
In addition to the general methodological points discussed in section II above, benefit

incidence studies for developing countries encounter a number of special considerations. These
include the large role that state enterprises may play in the delivery of specific public goods,
disparity in services provision between urban and rural areas and within urban and rural areas,
resalability of specific public goods, the expanded role for agricultural subsidies, as well as the
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influence of public serviceson rural to urban migration. These issues apply to some extent in
developed economies,but take on special importancein developingeconomies.
Public Enterprises
Important public infrastructureservicessuch as water, sewerage and electricityin many
developing countries are delivered through public enterprises. In estimating benefits, the
economic costs for servicesof the enterpriseshould be consideredalong with the amountof user.
fee paid for the service. In some countries,the user ile will equal the cost of the service and
ideally,consumersurplus or compensatedvariationshouldbe used to measure consumerbenefits.
If the enterpriseruns an economicloss, then the net subsidyfrom central revenueshould also be
allocated to households that receive these subsidizedservices.14 Deciding the anount of the
iinplicit subsidyfrom the central govenmuentwill generallynot be an easy matter, especiallyfor
enterprises that report accountingprofits, but actually suffer economic losses.
The benefits from access to public services, such as power for example, may appear
concentrated in the middle and upper income deciles of the population and in more urbanized
areas. However,some householdsmay install evasiondevices so that their electricityuse is not
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detected and billed. The implicit subsidy involvedwith illegal connectionsis often pro-poor.

In summay, public enterpriseswith their subsidiesand user fee orientationspose a particularly
challengingserviceprovision area for benefit estimation.
The Geographic Distribution of Benefits
In many instancesboth the quantityand quality of output from a public service vary by
location within a country. This regional variationis particularly acute betweenurban and rural
regions. In developing countriesregional variation in service delivery, together with regional
differencesin cost-of-living,make it very important to report results at least for urban and rural
regions (particularly given the large fraction of the population living in rural areas in most
developingcountries)and for otherrelevantregionaldivisionswithin the economy. In particular,
servicesfrompublic enterprises,schools,healthclinicsand hospitals,and transportationmay have
differential impacts in urban and rural areas, in addition to the more obvious examples of
agriculturalprograms and land refoin.
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There can also be significant variation in public services within the urban and rural
sectors, underscoring the point made above. For example, Selowsky (1979) finds significant
variation in educational, health and public utility services among urban areas of different sizes.
Meerman ('979) fmds significant variation in many public services among different rural
provinces of Malaysia.

In-Kind Transfers and Informal Markets
The potential for resale of in-kind goods provided by the government exists in both
developing and developed countries. However, this potential may be greater in most developing
countries due to their larger informnalsectors. To the extent that informal sector resale occurs,
the in-kind good provided to one person may confer benefits on several more individuals. For

example, sellers of in-kind goods receive the benefit income from the sales net of queuing costs
but buyers receive the consumer surplus from the good.16 Such transactions will make tracing
the benefits of public services particularly difficult, as individuals are unlikely to reveal in
household surveys the resale of in-kind goods.

Government Benefits and the Intrafamily Distribution of Resources
Whilemany studies in developingcountriesuse the householdas the unit of analysis,this
ignores important effects of governmentprograms on both intrafamilytransfers among related
households and the intrahouseholddistributionof resources. A first set of issues concerns the
difficulty of defining what constitutes a family in developing countries. Often the most
appropriate resolution of this issue would depend on the culture of the country, but available
survey data may not support culturally-relevantfamily definitions. For example, in Jamnaica,
fathersmay have children by severalwomen while beingmarried to none of them. Yet the father
may provide partial support to the children and the mothers. Identificationof such familiesmay
not be possible with existing data.
Another set of issues concerns the potential of government benefits to displace the
7 For exnample,
Cox and Jlimenez(1992) estimate that
existing pattem of intrafamilytransfers.1

the institutionof social security payments in Peru reduced private transfersfrom young to old
by 20 percent.
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Finally, govemment programs may differ in their effects on the intrahousehold distribution
of resources. For instance, recent theoretical analyses illustrate the well-known possibility that
in-kind benefits, being less fungible than cash benefits, can in some cases be more effectively
targeted at particular household members (Ross, 1988). Thus, benefits in the form of food or
education can be more beneficial for children than cash of equal value, if cash benefits accrue
differentially to the head of household (World Bank, World Development Report, 1990). Also,
many projects influence the role and status of women in the household (Fryer, 1986), though
comparatively little is known about such effects.

Food and Agricultural Programs
In many developing nations the agricultural sector plays a fundamental role in
development. Much of the population is directly or closely involved with agriculture(including
many of the most disadvantaged members of society), and a large fraction of GDP typically

originates in the agricultural sector. Thus, agriculturalgrowth rates and the distribution of
income within the rural economy are of interest in and of themselves. Also, development theory

has long stressed the importancefor growth of transferringagriculturalresources, both peasant
labor and agriculturaloutput, to the industrialsector (Lewis, 1954;Fei and Ranis, 1964;Sah and
Stiglitz, 1987)--thoughexcessive migration from mral to urban areas can cause crowding,
unemployment,poverty-strickensquatter colonies, and civic unrest (Williamson, 1988, surveys
this literature).18
Agricultural programs in developingcountries include: subsidization(or taxation) of
fertilizer, seed, and pesticides; subsidizationof credit; subsidizationof technology adoption;
subsidization(or taxation) of output and use of price controls, includinggovenmmentpurchases
(sales) and trade restrictions; irrigation schemes, improved transportation, and other rural public

works; and pro-poor land redistributions, restrictions on tenure, land settlement, and the
consolidationof holdings. Of these, only output taxation,regulationof trade, and regulationof
land tenure would not be classed as governmentexpenditures.
Conventionalanalyses of these programs typically allocate benefits to households in
proportion to farm income, though in some cases benefits are partially allocated to food
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consumers or to farmers in particular income brackets (DeWulf, pp. 87-88, surveys the early
literature; see also Meerman, 1979; Foxley et al., 1979; Bahl et al., 1986).19 These allocation
rules assume that there is zero benefit shifting. In addition to the benefit shifting that reflects
the relative elasticities of supply and demand, benefit shifting may adse due to interlinked
marketsand informallabor contracts,changingsocial sharingmechanisms,and migrationeffects.
Programsinvolvinginput subsidization,credit subsidization,technologysubsidization,or
output subsidizationcan all be analyzed as negativetaxes. In developed countrytax incidence
studies,commoditysubsidiesare often believedto be at leastpartly passed forwardto consumers.
One argumentagainst forwardshifting to consumersof subsidiesin developingcountriesis that
maintains a fixed consumerprice via export (import) controlsor
in many cases the govemrnment
govenmment
purchases(sales) (Meerman,p. 234). However,shifts in agriculturalsubsidieswould
requireadditionalgovernnent policy changesto maintainfixedconsumerprices (Sah and Stiglitz,
1987). Thus, the analyst fares a very complexissue.
In any event, even when subsidiesdo accrueto the agriculturalsector, the subsidiesmay
not accrue to intended low-income farmers. For exaample,traditional economic relations in
agriculturalmarkets are often characterizedby interlinkedmarkets and infomial labor contracts,
wherebypeasants, who may be the statutorybeneficiariesof subsidies,are kept near subsistence
through a variety of channels as landlords, moneylenders, and merchants appropriate any
increasesin surplus (Bravermanand Stiglitz, 1984;Bhaduii, 1983;Bell, 1988). Thus, in many
countriessizablefractions of the populaton remainindebted,landless,and near subsistence,even
in the post-fisc equiibrium, raising doubts as to the dbuton

effects of government

subsidies.
land reformand land settlementare typicallytreateddifferendy
Benefitsfrom govenmment
than other benefits. Meerman assumesthat land settlementcosts accrueto resettledhouseholds.
Foxleyassumes that land reform costs benefit agriculturallabor. Both approachesencounterthe
well-knownproblem that cost may be a poor proxy for benefit (especiallygiven the investment
nature of such spending). In addition, while land reform often offers the only prospect of
breakingthe cycles of poverty inherentin an unequaldistributionof land, criticsobserve that the
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poorest farners quickly return to their landless state. If social support systems have been
destroyed in the process of refonn, the poorest members of society may even be net losers
(Fitzgerald, 1987). The allocation of benefits is clearly problematicin this context.
Migration
Many developingcountriesare vulnerableto brain drains or the loss of the investmentin
human capital when wages or other arnenitiesare higher in alternativecountries (Lee and Tan,
1984). Governmentfunded scholarshipsfor attendinguniversitiesin other countriesoften carry
provisions that requirethe recipient to return to the home countryand work for the govemment
for a period of time. Enforcement,however, varies widely among countries. In addition,
residents educated at domestic universitiesor high schools often can emigrate with few or no
restrictions.
In addition to emigration from the country, public services will often induce migration
from the rural to the urban areas. Better educationalopportunities,better infrastructureand the
prospect of a job in the modem sector could induce migration from the rural to the urban areas
of a country (Todaro, 1969; Williamson, 1-988),and thus shift benefits between regions.
Providingbetter public servicesin urban comparedto rural areascan lead to lower relativewages
between urban and rural areas if the public services differentialinducesmigrtion from mral to
urban areas. The wage effects of geographicallyspecificpublic servicesmay significantlyoffset
the benefits from providing urban public services.

IV.

Developed Country Benefit Incidence: Empirical Results
The benefit incidence literaturefor developed countriesfocuses primarily on the direct

benefits of govemmentspendingas proxiedby their costs, largely ignoringthe incomeand price
effects of govermnent spending and making at most, niinor allowancesfor benefit shifting.
Studies of this type for the United States include Gillespie (1965),Aaron and McGuire (1970),
Herriot and Miller (1972), Musgrave,Case, and Leonard(1974), Maital (1973, 1975), Reynolds
and Smolensky(1977), and O'Higgins and Ruggles(1981a).20 Other developedcountry studies
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include LeGrand (1982) and O'Higgins and Ruggles (1981b) for the United Kingdom, Gruske
(1985) for West Germany, and Leu et al. (1985) for Switzerland.
Of these, only O'Higgins and Ruggles (1981a and 1981b) allocate expenditures by
variables other than income, including number of earners per household, race, and sex. However,
they do not examninethese variables in conjunction with income. In none of the studies is
household income adjusted for household size or composition. Nor do the studies consider the
benefit effects of government spending on the intra-household distribution of resources.
Table 1 summarizes the main findings of this literature. There is general agreement that
among the studies that specific govenmmentservices have a pro-poor distribution in percentage
terms when benefits are calculated as a percentage of income. Transfer payments are clearly
pro-poor, and the allocation of so-called pure public goods depends greatly on one's essumptions
about the distribution of their benefits among households.
However, examining the distribution of expenditure (not as a percentage of income) on
specific govermmentservices in each group can yield very different answers about progressivity
(DeWulf, 1975; and Meerman, 1979), as the results reported in Table 1 also indicate. Given the
different conclusions reached from these two benefit incidence measures (expenditure and
expenditure as a percentage of income), we recommnendfollowing O'Higgins and Ruggles (198 la
and 1981b) who report both sets of figures. We examine these results in greater detail below.
Specific Government Services
Specific or "allocable" govefrnmentservices include education, agriculture, highways, and
a variety of in-kind transfers (including transfers in the fonn of health care, housing, and
food).2 1 Educational benefits are typically distributed on the basis of school-age children per
household. In the United States education benefits are generally found to be pro-poor in
percentage terms and pro-rich in dollar terms. Similar results are found for the United Kingdom
(O'Higgins and Ruggles, 1981a and LeGrand, 1982) and Switzerland (Leu et al.). However, such
conclusions may be premature insofar as the studies surveyed typically ignored the following
considerations: (i) the investment return to educational achievement across income groups,
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SELECTED INCIDENCE STUDIES FOR DEVELOPED COUNTiWES
Studv, Country, Year of Data
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distibution of expediues across income deciles. The dgns in parthes
are progessivity resultsbased on
expenditureas a percentage of income in each decile. For a more detailedpresentationof these results,
includingmore extensive notes on the various methodologies,see Selden and Wasyleako(1990).
bTypicailyincludes defense,intemationalsecurity,public health, and other general expenditures.
Distributedone-balf by householdsand one-halfby householdincome.
dDistributed by households.
'Distributed by householdincome.
*aital's

(1975) calculations based on Aaron and McGuire (1970) (treats aU non-transfer expenditures as

public or general.)
SDisti.butedby individuals.
'Distibuted by capital income.
Transfes induded with allocableexpenditumes
in first colm
JDistributed one-half by population and one-half by income.

SOURCES:

Reynolds and Smolensky,1977,pp. 112-114, 124-129;Gillespie, 1965, pp. 138, 139, and
174; Heriot and Miller, 1972,pp. 46, 49; Musgrave,Case, and Leonard, 1974.pp. 285, 292,
294, and 300; O'Higgins and Ruggles,1981a,pp. 307-308;Leu, Frey, and Buhmann.1985,
p. 353; Griske, 1985,pp. 245-248.

21

(ii) the distinction between measuringbenefits and allocating costs, (iii) the wide variation in
school quality across jurisdictions (an obviousproblem if quality is coffelatedwith income).
Benefits from governmenthealth spending,in the United States are typically found to be
pro-poor in both dollar and percentageterms (GiUlespie,1965; O'Higgins and Ruggles, 198lb),
though a number of studies do not report health benefits separatelyfrom other social services.
In the United Kingdom, however, health care benefits are not pro-poor as households in the
lowest-income deciles (O'Higgins and Ruggles, 1981a) and in lower socio-economicgroups
(LeGrand, 1978) use the national health service at lower than average rates. Thus, health
spending in the United Kingdom is typicaUypro-poor only when benefits are measured as a
percentageof income. Healthspendingin Switzerlandis distributionallyneutralin absoluteterms
(Leu et al., 1985). Thus, even in developedcountriesnationalhealth systems may-be less propoor than more carefully targeted programs.
Governmentexpenditureson agricultureprimarily consist of crop price supports (prior
to 1980 these were largely crop purchases). Other agriculturalexpendituresinclude extension,
research, and farm mortgage insurance (typically ignored, since it is an off-budget item).
Agricultural expenditures are typicaUydistributed on the basis of farn proprietorship(e.g.,
Musgrave, Case, and Leonard, Table 5) or net fann income (e.g., Reynolds and Smolensky,
Tables E.1-E.3). Becausefann ownershipincreaseswith income, but more slowly than income,
the studies surveyedconcludethat agricultureexpendituresare pro-poorin percentageterms and
pro-rich in absolute tenrs.
Govemment highway expenditmesin developed economies are small in relation to all
goverumentexpenditures(roughly5 percentin the UnitedStates in 1970). Highwayexpenditures
are typically allocatedto householdsas drivers of automobilesand to householdsas consumers
of transported products (this is perhaps the only time benefit shifting is brought into the
analyses). Reynolds and Smolenskyuse a 50-50 split between driversand consumers(Reynolds
and Smolensky,Table E.2), while Musgrave,Case, and Leonard use a two-thirds/one-thirdsplit
(see their Table 5). No authors explicitly account for the investment nature of highway
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expenditures,an especially large problem given the positive net investmentduring all periods
analyzed.
Transfer payments are clearly pro-poor in both absolute and percentageamounts if they
are fully allocatedto recipientsin any given year. However,these incidencemeasures of pu'blic
transfers do not account for their displacement effects on interhouseholdprivate transfers.
Moreov r, social pension paym3nts should probably be viewed from a lifetimneperspective,
accountingfor both taxespaid and cash benefitsreceived. O'Higgins and Rugglesanalyze social
pensions by age bracket and offer a perspectiveon the incidenceof transfer payments across
generations of beneficiaries. Benefit analysis by age and income bracket helps distinguish
between the incidence on the younger and older elderly and discem how the lowest income
householdsfare in each generationof elderly.
General Public Goods
There is widespread disagreementnot only about how to distribute general public good
benefits, but also about which goods and services to include in this category. Most authors
follow the Tax Foundation(1967) definition of public goods to be "national defense, general
government (excluding interest), transportation(excluding highways), commerce and finance,
housing and communitydevelopments,health and sanitation,civilian safety and miscellaneous"
(from Aaron and McGuire, p. 915). Other authors exclude public housing and health
expenditures,allocating benefits from those goods on the basis of use. Unfortunately,as noted
by DeWulf (1981, p. 69), no studies allow public good income elasticitiesto vary by the type
of public good, so that programsas differentas defenseand communitydevelopmentare assumed
to have the same relationshipbetween benefits and income.
Benefit incidencefor general public goods in the United States,the United Kingdom and
Switzerland are presented in Table 1. General goods are widely agreed to be pro-poor in
percentageterms and pro-rich in dollar terms, thoughmany authorshave criticizedthe results for
the arbitrry assumptionsused to distribute benefits among households.
In contrastto the standardbenefitincidenceresultsabove, Piggott andWhalleyuse a CGE
model for Australiato calculate both the marginalbenefitand the full consumersurplus measures
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from general public goods. In particular, their marginal benefit measure suggests that general
expenditures are pro-poor, while their equivalent variation measures suggest the reverse. While
the assumptions underlying their results are no less restrictive than the studies in the Aaron and
McGuire marginal benefit tradition, the CGE results illustrate the problems involved when
marginal benefit measures are used to make inferences about large changes in public programs.

V.

Developing Country Benefit Incidence: Empirical Results

Studies of Total Public Expenditure Benefits
Since the critical review by DeWulf, we are aware of only four comprehensive benefit
incidence studies: Meennan (1979) for Malaysia, Foxley et al. (1979) for Chile, Bahl et al.
(1986) for Korea, and Riboud (1990) for Costa Rica. Of these studies, Foxley et al., and Bahl
et aW.,examine all government expenditures, whereas Meerman and Riboud place most of their
emphasis on specific government expenditures. The results of these full benefit incidence studies
are presented in Table 2. All four studies find government expenditures to be pro-poor in
percentage terms, while Meernan and Foxley et al., find government expenditures to be pro-rich
in dollar terms and Riboud finds government expenditures to be neutral in dollar terms.
In Meerman's benefit analysis, only about 33 percent cf expenditures are allocable direcly
to households based on their use of particular government services. Other specific expenditures
are assigned to households in proportion to their income, but Meerman does not assign to
households t2hebenefits from general or unchargeable expenditures322 The total benefits based
on use of services, have a pro-rich distribution, but less so than the benefits assigned in
proportion to income.23
Foxley et al., analyze Chilean public expenditures (and taxes) using a 1969 survey of
households in Chile. They follow Meerman's methods for allocating specific services to
households based on their utilization of the service, when information of the service utilization
is available. Nonetheless, most of the analysis allocates expenditures to households based on
consumer expenditure, household income and, in some cases, on a per household basis (see
Poxley et al., Table 21). The results also show that the distribution of expenditures is more

24

TABLE 2
SUMMARYRESULTS FOR TOTAL PUBLIC EXPFNDlTURE BENEFITS
IN FOUR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Author, Country, Year of Data
Mecaman,Malayda, 1974

Total Expenditures
-s

Bahl et aL, South Korea

Urban 1965

+

+

1968
1971

+

1974

++

Rural

1965

+
+
+

1968
1971

1974
Foxley et aL, Chile
I

~~~~~~~~~+

U

~~~~~~~~~+

Riboud,Cost Rima 1986

+

'A "plus indicatesthat public ex_diue
ae pro-poor on equality
enhancing,while a "mius" indicatesthat public expendituresreduce equality on
a pro-rich Pogressvity rsults are based on expenditureas a percentageof
income comparedacross income gOups. BahI et aL also examinesthe percent
of total expenditurespent in each income class. They find expenditues
distributedmofe equally than income and with more progressivityover tume.
bA "4e"indicatesthat public expendituresare pro-poor and have become
inceasingly pro-poor in that region of the countryduring the 1965to 1974 time
period. A "+-" indicatesthat public expendituresare pro-poor but have become
less pro-poor in that region of the country dudng the 1965 to 1974time period.
SOURCES:

Meennan, 1979,p. 321; Dabl et aL, 1986,pp. 150-215;Foxley
et aL, 1979,p. 119, Riboud, 1990,Table IL 4.
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pro-poor than the distributionof income. Unfortunately,the lowest income group in the Foxley
et al. study has 30 percent of the householdsin Chile. To some extent the most interestingpart
of benefit incidence is what happens within the lowest 30 percent of the income distribution,
especially to the bottom 10 or 20 percent of the householdsin the income distribution. Thus,
their results shed little light on benefit incidencein the poorest households.
Baiil et al. examine the distributionof benefitsin SouthKorea, in conjunctionwith taxes,
for 1965, 1968, 1971, and 1974. They analyze benefits for urban and rural residents using
householddata. The data are separatedinto currentand capital components,and 5 percent of the
annual capitalexpenditure is assumedto accrue to householdsas capitalservices in the current
year. Debt repaymentis used to approximatethe currentservices that accrue to householdsfrom
past capital expenditures. Because debt repaymentis apparentlynot available by.expenditure
category,Bahl et A. do not present benefitsfor individualfunctions. However,they do allocate
the general componentsof expendituresto householdsbased on both a householdincome or on
a per householdbasis. For example, one-halfof health benefitsis allocatedto householdsbased
on householdincome and one-halfof health benefits is allocatedon a per householdbasis. Onehalf of educationexpendituresis allocatedto householdsbased on the number of studentsin the
household and the balance is allocatedon the basis of householdincome. They use income,
consumptionor per household bases to allocate expenditureson other functions to households.
The results suggest that benefits are distributadmore equitably amnongfamily income
deciles than income. Moreover,in urban areas, the modernizationof South Korealead to a more
equitabledistributionof benefits in 1974than in 1965. But while the distributionof benefitsin
rural areas is pro-poor in 1974, it is not as pro-poor in 1974 as in 1965.
The results of this study are interesting, but not very rich in comparisonto the more
elaborate analysis of the health and education sectors that Meerman and others offer.
Nonetheless,the Bahl et al. study representswhat is feasible when all functions are included in
the analysis, several differentyears are analyzed and the time frame for completing the project
is limited.
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Education
expenditures on education averageroughly 11 percent of total government
Govenmment
spending in low-income and lower-middle-incomedeveloping countries. However, perhaps
because of issucs surroundingequality of opportunity,rigidity in class structure, the extemal
effectsof human capital,and interest in increasingfees to finance secondaryeducation,education
has played a central role in the benefit incidence literature (for an early discussion of these
issues, see Psacharopoulos,1977). In particular,existing benefit incidence calculationsoffer
important insights into the likely effects of reallocating governnent resources from higher
educationto primary or secondaryeducation.
Several recent studies done for variousdevelopingcountriesexamine the distributionof
educationalbenefLtsacross income classes (see Table 3). Meerman (1979) for Malaysia and
Selowsky (1979) for Colombia represent the best known studies, but Foxley et al. (1979) for
Chile, Castenada (1989) for Chile, Riboud (1990) for Costa Rica, and Selden and Wasylenko
(1992)for Peru also report benefit resultsfor education. Additionalbenefit incidencestudies for
education include Jallade (1974) for Colombia,Dasguptaand Tilak (1983) for India, Meesook
(1984) and van de WaUle(1992) for Indonesia,Hammer et al. (1992) for Malaysia,and Petrei
(1987) for five countriesin Central or South America.
All of these studies use household surveysto examine school attendance by household
and allocate educationalbenefits to householdsbased on the numberof children in the household
attending school. Most examine the distribution of benefits separately for urban and nural
households,and in some cases for households in different size urban areas. Meerman also
examines the benefits across races within Malaysia.
The studies typicallyfind that benefitsare pro-poor as a percentageof householdincome
for primary and secondaryeducation andpro-richfor post-secondaryeducation. Indeed,benefits
from primary and secondaryeducation are often pro-poor when examined on a dollar basis, as
well. The pro-poor incidence occurs due to the greater number of children in lower-income
households. Thus, the results of these studies sunmarized in Table 3 generally confirm the
argumentsof Psacharopoulos(1977) that expenditureon pnrmaryeducation is pro-poor,while
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TABLE 3

DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATIONALSUBSIDYIN SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
BY COUNTRY AND REGION

I

T

Author, Year of Data, Countrl
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+
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+

+

-

+

Dominican Republic

+

_

_

_

Uruguay

+

4

_

+
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TABLE 3 (CONT.)

Author, Year of Data, Country

Primary

Secondary

Higher
Education

Total
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+
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Selowsky, 1794, Colwnbia (expenditure)
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+
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Riboud, 1986, Costa Rica (expenditue)
Selden and Wasylenko, 1985, Pem (expenditure)

_

*+- pro-poor; - pro-rich,0 neutral; +- eqpntues per householdincas
for first few deciles
and decrases tdwreafer ? - no dear patnte NA = not availab1e.
"Expenditureindicatesthat the equality conclusionsare based on educationalexpenditurefor households
acmss income groups;expenditueAncomeindicatesthat the equaliy conclusionsare based on educational
expendituresas a percentageof income across income groups.
SOURCES: Meerman (1979),p. 112; Selowsky(1979),pp. 6667; Jallade (1974),pp. 36-40; Foxley et aL
(1979),Castenada(1989), pp. 30 and 60; Petre (1987),pp. 84-88;Dasgupta and Tilak (1983);
Meesook (1984); Riboud (1990),Table 111.4;van de Walle (1992),Table 14; Seldenand
Wasylenko(1992),Table 3.

29
expenditure on higher education levels tends to be pro-rich, but the exact point in the education
system at which the rich become favored differs among countries. These same results generally
hold for both urban and rural areas, although secondary education is less likely to be pro-poor
in rural areas than in urban areas due to low attendance rates by the poor in rural areas.
Incidence pattems based on a single year of data may not capture accurately the changes
in behavior or policy that are in progress. For example, van de Walle (1992) examines education
in Indonesia and compares her results to those obtained by Meesook for 1978. The education
subsidy in 1987 is about as pro-poor as it is in 1978. However, in 1987, children from poorer
households are much more likely to attend lower and senior secondary schools than they are in
1978. For Malaysia, Hammer et al. (1992) find that educational subsidies at the primary and
secondary level favor the poor more in 1989 than in 1974. Higher education subsidies continue
to favor higher-income households, however.
Selden and Wasylenko find that in Peru the incidence pattem for educational subsidies
per school-age child differs from the incidence pattem for educational subsidy per child in school.
The fonner pattem tends to be less pro-poor than the latter at lower-income deciles, because a
lower proportion of children from lower-income households attend school, and thus, do not
receive the educational subsidy. However, at higher-income the incidence pattem of educational
subsidies per school-age child is also less pro-rich deciles than the per child in school measure.
Children from higher-income households are more likely to attend private schools and thus forego
the educational subsidy. In Peru at least, and probably in other countries, differences in the
patterns of school attendance 3mong children in different deciles and differences in the number
of children in different deciles affect the incidence pattem.
These studies encounter a number of methodological problems. For instance, marginal
benefits may decline with the level of education.

In this case, studies that only allocate

expenditure and not total benefits may underestimate the degree to which education expenditure
benefits the poor, as they are more likely to consume primary education, which may have a
higher marginal benefit than secondary education. Better measures of benefits would be based
on willingness to pay, an approach pursued by Gertler and Glewwe (1989). Also, researchers
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differ on the measurementof capitalinputs. Many studiesignore capitalexpenditure. Bahl et al.
allocate 5 percent of new capital expenditureas capital servicesaccruingin the current year and
allocate repaymentson existing debt as a proxy for the services from the existing capital stock.
In contrast, Meerman estimates the flow of services from the education capital stock as the
(estimated) capital stock multiplied by an interest rate of 15 percent (i.e., depreciation and
opportunitycosts).
Another area of methodologicalweakness involves life-cycle questions. For instance,
Jamesand Benjamin(1987)in a study of Japan show that familieswith youngerhouseholdheads
are more likely to have both young children and low incomes while families with older
householdheads have older children and higher incomesdue simply to the age-earningsprofiles.
Selden and Wasylenko(1992)find a similar pattem in Peruvian householdage compositionand
income. At any point in time then primaryeducation expenditureswill look more pro-poor and
higher education expendituresmore pro-rich than they would if education expenditures were
viewed from a lifetime perspectivebased on the permanentincome of the household and total
educationreceivedby householdmembers. Another life-cycleissue missedby all studies is that
in some countriescoUegegraduatesare entidtledto governmentpositions they may not otherwise
obtain. Thus, govemmentspending on such individualsdoes not always end with graduation.
FinaUy, the studies all ignore changes in relative prices, incomes, and location. For
instance,because rural-urbanmigrationmay be due to geographicdifferencesin public services
as well as wage differentials,andbecauseeducationexpendituresexhibitan urban bias, the urban
benefits to education expendituresmay be at least partially dissipated through increasedurban
crowding, lower wages, and higher land prices. In addition, benefit studies typicaUydo not
account for educationalservicequality differencesbetween urban and rural areas.
Despitethese caveats, benefitincidencestudiescan yield importantinsights into proposed
changes in education, such as reallocating resources from higher education to primary and
secondaryeducation. A second policy might be to increase user fees for all or some levels of
education. Here the evidence to date suggeststhat this may have adverseconsequencesfor the
poor, particularlyif fees are increasedfor primary education. A third policy might be to target
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stipends to poor students at all levels of education.

In this regard, Meernan (1979) and

Chernichovsky and Meesook (1985) look at the indirect costs--uniforms, transportation, foregone
labor earnings and other expenses--of schooling that can become a relatively high share of
income for low-income households and deter school attendance.2 4 a5
Health
Govenmmenthealth expenditures total roughly 5 percent of government expenditures in
developing countries (de Ferranti, 1985). While these expenditures are only a small portion of
total spending, there has been considerable interest in recent proposals for increased user fees,
improved efficiency of health care providers, and reallocation of resources from curative to
preventive care. Distributional questions have played a central role in this debate, both because
health care costs can be large relative to the incomes of the poor, and because of what Musgrave
termed "merit goods arguments" in favor of universal health care.2 6
Recent benefit incidence calculations for public health spending in developing countries
include Sahota (1977) for Panama; Meerman (1979) for Malaysia; Selowsky (1979) for
Colombia; Foxley et al. (1979) for Chile; Meldau (1980) for Colombia; Meesook (1984) and
van der Wallc (1992) for Indonesia; Bahl et al. (1986) for South Korea; Petri (1987) for five
Central or South American countries; and Riboud (1990) for Costa Rica. These studies employ
a wide variety of methods for estimating expenditures and for allocating the expenditures on
govenmmenthealth programs to households.27 Incidence simulations based on wilingness to
pay have also been performed by Gertler et al. (1988) for Peru. Finally, recent studies that
provide a wealth of distribution-related data, but do not provide formal benefit incidence analyses
include Griffim(1990) for Asia and Castenada (1989) for Chile.
There are a large number and variety of govenmmenthealth programs in many developing
countries and each has very different distributional implications. It follows that the best benefit
incidence studies rely on survey data of household utilization of specific health services (e.g.,
Meermian, 1979; Hanmmeret al., 1992; Selowsky, 1979; and Foxley, 1979; Meesook, 1984; van
de Walle, 1992; Riboud, 1990). In all cases, care must be taken to account for both monetary
and nonmonetary costs of the household of utilization, especially since' fees often vary with
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ability to pay.28 Moreover, the quantity and quality of care received may differ from utilization
or the number of trips made to physicians or hospitals per se. Nevertheless, efforts to determine
benefit incidence based on household utilization data for individual programs can be much more
informative than simply allocating the benefits of the health care system as a whole by household
income, by household size, or as a general good.
Benefits from curative health care expenditures are typicaUy pro-poor in percentage terms
(less so in dollar terms) (see Table 4). When researchers are able to distinguish among types of
care, inpatient care is less pro-poor than outpatient care, which is, in turn, less pro-poor than
preventive care. However, the incidence results vary greatly among countries. Riboud examines
1986 data for Costa Rica reported by Sauma and Trejos (1990) that suggest health expenditures
in that country are significantly pro-poor. Hanuner et al. (1992) fmd that health expenditures in
Malaysia favor the poor more in 1989 than in 1974. In contrast, Meesook reports 1978 data for
Indonesia suggesting that government health care benefits are significantly pro-rich in that
country.29 van de Walle fmds that the health care subsidy in Indonesia remains pro-rich in
1987, although the poor have captured more of the subsidy by 1987. The health care subsidy
gains accrue to the urban poor in Indonesia, and the rural poor do not gain between the time
periods. Selowsky and Meesook also report benefit. incidence separately by region, though in
both cases the separate incidence results for each region are roughly the same as the total results.
Benefit incidence analyses of health programs can provide important insights into
proposed policy changes. Two policies of recent interest are: moving resources from curative
to preventive care, and increasing user fees. With respect to the former, the benefits of increased
prevention programs would likely be concentrated more heavily on the poor than the rich, since
higher-income households already have higher rates of inoculation and other preventive measures,
and the marginal benefits would likely accrue to the poor. At the same time, publicly-funded
curative care tends to be less pro-poor and reductions in curative care expenditures would affect
the poor less than the rich. With respect to increasing user fees, relatively high utilization by the
poor of aU health services suggests that the poor will pay a substantial portion of such fees (or
reduce their consumption of public health). Thus, it is critical to specify how the user fees would
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TABLE 4

THE BENEFIT INCEDENCEOF GOVERNMENTHEALTH PROGRAMS,
BY COUNTRY AND REGION.
Author. Year of Data. Country
l

I

Inpatient I
CountaTo~~~~~~~tal

Out atient and Other
VPublcHealth

F03leX.196.6 CbiJeb

NA

NA

Sabota- 1970. Pnnnea'

NA

MA

Meernno. 1974. Malaufa,b

+ (+I
NA

+ (+O

(+)
±

Selow-lcy 1974 Colobmnb

TotaL

I

(+)

?

4+
+

? (+'

Petrei

Argentina
Costa Rica

NA
NA

NA
NA

NA (+)
NA (+)

Chile

NA

NA

NA (+)

DominicanRepublic
Uruguay

NA
NA

NA
NA

NA (+)
NA (+)

+ (+)

+ (+)

_o (NA)

_ (NA)

(NA)

Meldau, 1970,Colombia'

-

Meesook, 1978, Indonesia

_d (NA)

(+)

van de Walle, 1987, Indonesia

-

Riboud, 1986, Costa Rica

+ (+)

Hammer,Nabi, Cerone, 1989,Malaysia

4.

-

(+)

(+)

Meesook, 1978, Indonesia

+ (+)

4

(4)

+ (+)

7

(+)

+ (+)

van de Walle, 1987,Indonesia

(NA)

_
-

(+)
Rural

Selowsky, 1974,Colombiab
Meesook, 1978, Indonesia

van de WaUe,1987, Indonesia

? (+)
_d (NA)
-

(0)

(+)

+ (+)

Urban
Selowsky, 1974,Colombiab

-

o

(NA)

J

+ (.)
(NA)

-

t_____(+)

-

(+)

_

? (+)

0 (4)
-o
-

(NA)

(+)

(NA)

-

-

(+)

'+ = pro-poor, - = pro-rich; 0= neutral; ? = no clear picture; NA= not available. Results are based on
benefitsper household. Results based on benefits/incomeare presentedin parentheses.
bResultsbased on survey data
'Results based on ad hoc allocatoisacross households.
dAlIhospitalcare.
'Public health clinicsonly.
SOURCES. Foxley, 1979,p. 108; Sahota, 1977,p. 216; Meemnan,1979, pp. 158-160;Selowsky, 1979,pp.
89-96; Petrei 1987,p. 47; Meldau, 1980,p. 138; Meesook,1985,p. 69; Riboud, 1990,Table
lLt4;van de Walle, 1992,Table 18.
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be levied and how the revenues generated would be spent. These conclusions are largely
confimed by Gertler et al. (1988). They estimate the demand for public and private curative
care using flexible functional forms and use the estimates obtained to simulate differential
expenditure incidenceanalyses of increaseduser fees, where incrementalrevenues are spent on
reducing time costs by opening more clinics. Gertler et al. conclude that such changes would
be pro-rich, reinforcingthe view that while user fees can enhance efficiency, they may reduce
equity unless fees are levied progressivelyor revenues are used in a pro-poor manner.
Electricity, Water and Sewerage
The literature on benefit incidencehas typically not analyzed the benefits from public
enterprises. As servicesare typicallynot metered,calculationsof the net subsidiesfor particular
enterprises to individual households are difficult to obtain. Nevertheless, the Selowsky and
Meermanstudies are able to examine access to electricity,water and sewerage services among
income groups in Colombia and Malaysia, respectively. In addition to these two studies,
Maddockand Castano use compensatedvariation to measure the benefits from electric services
that accrue to householdsin Medellin, Colombia.
Selowskyexamines access to infrastructureservice among income quintilesin Colombia
using householdsurveydata for 1970 and 1974. He findsthat householdsresiding in urban areas
having higher income are more likelyto have thesepublic services(see Table 5). Between 1970
and 1974, however,he finds a pro-poor distributionfor new connectionsamong households,but
households receiving new connectionsare more likely to live in larger urban areas. Among
householdsin rural areas, the new connectionsare not nearly as pro-poor as in the urban areas.
Selowsky also examines whether supply availability or lack of demand is responsible for the
lower number of connections to these public services among lower income households. His
surveyevidence suggeststhat the cost of servicedeters most householdsthat are withoutservice
from connectingto the supply or that demand rather than supply constraintslead householdsto
live without these public services.
Also using 1974 survey data, Meerman examineshousehold access to electricity,piped
water and sewerage by income quintile. His findingsfor Malaysiaare similar to those of

35

TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC UT!LITY SERVICES IN TWO COUNTRIES:
MALAYSIA,COLOMBIA

Electricity

___________

Author, Year of Data, Country
Meerman, 1974, Malaysab

Urban

_

Maddock and Castano,1986, Medellin,

+

0

Country

_

-'

Selowsky, 1974, Colombiab
Colombia

Rural

_

NA
I_

NA
I

Household Piped Water
Meerman, 1974, Malaysiad

_

Selowsky, 1974, Colombiad

_

__
_

Publk or Private Sewerage
Meerman, 1974, Malaysiae

_

Selowsky, 1974, Colombia

_

' = pro-poor, - = pro-icbh 0= neutal; ? = no clear pattern; NA = not available.
bPerceage of householdswith connectionsby income quitile.
'Compenated vaiation for users of electricity.
dPercentageof householdswith water supply by incomequindle.
"Perountageof householdswith seweragecomnectionsby income quintle.
SOURCES:

Meeuman(1979),pp. 182,202, 213; Selowsky(1979), Tables SA-28,SA-30, SA32; and Maddock and Castano (nd.).

36
Selowsky. Thedistributionof serviceconnectionsfor electricity,water and sewerageis pro-rich,
with the percentageof householdsin any income quintilereceiving servicesincreasing with the
size of the urban area. Meermanalso finds that the percentageof householdsconnectedto these
services is greater for Chinese and Indian householdsthan for Malay households.
Maddockand Castanoexaminethe compensatedvariation associatedwith block pricing
of electrical utility services in Medellin, Colombia. While they fmd the practice of charging
higher prices for large electricityusers is pro-poor, their empirical work focuses on electricity
usage and does not account for households without electrical services or for households with
illegal connecdons to electricalservices(see Maddockand Castano, p. 6). Thus, the Maddock
and Castano study cannot be taken as evidenceof a pro-poor distributionof net benefits from
electrical service. From the evidence available, the working hypothesis must be-that lower
income and rural householdsreceive the least total subsidyfor these public services.
The Whittingtonet al. (1988), Whittingtonet al. (1989) and Altaf et al. (1989) studies
offer insight into why low income householdsdo not connect to the public water system, even
when they apparentlycan afford to do so. These studies suggestchangesin program designthat
miightchange low-incomehouseholdsdemand for connectionto the public water system.
Altaf et al. fmd in Pakistanthat, contraryto conventionalwisdom,the annualor recurrent
charge for water and not the one-timeconnectioncharge is the deterrent to the poor connecting
to public systems. The availabilityof alternativewater sources also influencesthe probability
of connectingto public systems.
The two studies by Whittingtonet al. raise similar issues for two regions in Nigeria. In
both regions the poor have altemativesourcesof water, which is from trucksthat bring water to
the village. Some low-incomehouseholdspurchase water directly from the truck, while others
purchasethe waterfrom intermediarieswho have purchasedwater from the truck. In both cases,
households do not want the commitnent of paying a fixed monthly charge for water, or they
want the option of paying ondy for water during the dry season. Thus, households prefer a
metered system to that of unlimiteduse and a fixed monthly charge. The fact that households
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do not trust the quality of the water sold from the govenmmentalso significantly deters
households from connecting to the public water system.
Based on these results, Whittingtonet al. proposesupplyingpublic water to villages from
a central kiosk o. set of kiosks, where kiosks will be metered and water purchasers would be
charged for the water that they purchase. This system avoids the substantialcosts of metering
all houses, and allows householdsto purchase the exact amount of publiclysupplied water that
they want. A side benefit is that the public water system can demonstrateits reliability to the
households.
Food and Agricultural Programs
In many developing nations the agricultural sector plays a fundamental role in
development. Much of the populationis directlyor closelyinvolvedwith agriculture(including
many of the most disadvantagedmembers of society) and a large fraction of GDP typically
orginates in the agriculturalsector. Also, developmenttheory has long stressed the importance
for growth of transferringagriculturalresources to the industrial sector (Lewis, 1954; Fei and
Ranis, 1964; Sah and Stiglitz, 1987).3° Finally, government food distribution programs can
have impotant welfare effects by increasing food consumptionamong the poorest households
and by reducing wage rates in nonagriculturaloccupations. We discuss agriculturalprograms
before tuming to food programs.
programmay differentiallyaffect the agriculturalsector through
While any govemrnment
urban-ural variauon, a more narrow list of goverunent expenditures in agriculture includes:
(i) subsidizationof ferllizer, seed, pesticides, credit, and technologyadoption; (ii) govenmment
purchases (sales) of agricultural outputs; (iii) public works development of agricultural
infrastructure;and (iv) land redistribution. Benefit incidence studies that explicitly examine
agricultureincludeMeerman for Malaysia,Foxley et al. for Chile, and Bahl et al. for Korea.
Due to the scarcity of household survey data on program participation, most studies
assume that agriculturalbenefitsare distributedin proportionto farm income, thoughBahl et al.
allocate benefits partly in proportion to farm income and partly in proportion to food
consumpdon,and some authorsmake differentdistributionalassumptionsfor land reforn, small
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farmer projects, and agricultural credit.31 Moreover, due to the scarcity of cost data on
individualprograms, the analysesare often conducted at a very aggregate level.
Allocating the benefits of agriculturalprograms accordingto farm income leads to the
conclusion that agriculturalprograms do not greatly affect the rural income distribution. In
addition,the assumptionsvirtuaUyinsurethat the overaUcontributionof agriculturalprograms
is pro-poor to the extent rural houseiolds are poorer than urban households. While these results
may be substantiaUycorrect, they offer few insights into the distributionalimplicationsof policy
changes that reallocate resourcesamong agriculturalprograms.32
The allocation of progrnamcosts by farm income involves a strong assumption that
benefits are not shifted ahead to consumers. This seems unlikely even in the presence of
3 3 Benefits might also be shifted backwards
government-imposedcommnodityprice rigidities.

to laborers. Finally, benefits may be shifted to landlords,moneylenders,and merchants,due to
interlinked markets and informal labor contracts. For instance, peasants, who may be the
statutory or direct beneficiariesof an agriculturalprogram, may remain near subsistencelevels
of welfarein the post-fiscequilibriumas landlords,moneylenders,and merchantsappropriateany
increasesin surplus (Bravermanand Stiglitz, 1984;Bhaduri, 1983;Bell, 1988).
Given the complex shiftingpossibilities for agriculturalbenefits, one fruitful approach
may be to calculate incidence using computablegeneral equilibriumtechniques. Two recent
contributionsin this literature are by Hertel (1989), who examines agriculturalpolicy in the
United States, and Parikh and Srinivasan (1989), who make incidence comparisons among
agriculturalinfrastructure,fertlizer subsidies,and agriculturaloutput subsidies. They fnd that
the infrastructure expenditures have pro-poor distributional implications, resulting from the
benefits of employmentopportunitiesfrom the infrastucture projects for the poor.
Turning to food programs, Foxley et al. find the distributionof food subsidiesin Chile
to be pro-poor in dollar terms. Riboud(1990)also findsthe distributionof foodprogrambenefits
in Costa Rica to be pro-poor in dollar terms and narrowlytargeted at individualsaged S to 14.
Grosh (1990) uses survey data and finds that public food programs in Jamaica are effectively
targeted at the poor. In addition, a number of studies use systems of demand equations to
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simulate the welfare implicationsof reducing subsidiesfor various types of food. For instance,
Laraki (1989)finds that reduced subsidieswould adverselyaffect the poor, despite the pro-rich
distributionof the food subsidy.34
Consumer Price Subsidies
Eastern Europe's desire to move to a private market-basedeconomy raises questions
concerningthe equity effects of removing consumer subsidies. The Govemment of Hungary
(1989)has undertakena partial equilibriumanalysisfor Hungary. Data from a householdsurvey
undertakenin 1987 and updated to 1989 are analyzed. The main conclusion of the Hungarian
report is that the distributionof the per capita total subsidyis pro-rich, as the amountof the per
capita subsidy increases with income decile. More specifically,per capita subsidiesfor rent,
fuels, milk and diaryproducts,transportation,cinema and theater, and mortgageinterest are prorich (see Governmentof Hungary,statisticalappendix,page 39).
On the other hand, the subsidyamount as a percentageof incomedecreaseswith income
decile implying that the subsidy has an equalizing effect on the distributionof income. For
specificproducts, the subsidiesto milk products,fuel, transportation,schoolbooks and mortgage
interest are pro-poor when measuredas a percentageof income, while subsidiesto cinema and
theater are sdll pro-rich (see Govermmentof Hungary,statisticalappendix,page 42). In addition,
the analysisreveals that the total subsidy as a percentageof income increases with family size
and has an urban bias.

VI.

Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
The availableempiricalresultsfor developingcountriessuggestthat the benefitincidence

of spending on human services, such as education and health, is pro-poor when measuredas a
percentage of income and either pro-poor or pro-rich when measuredin dollar terns depending
on the public serviceunder analysis. Benefitrecipientsare alsoparticularlyconcentratedin urban
areas,perhaps because of lower delivery costs. Governmentagriculturalprograms are typically
believed to be distributionallyneutral in percentageterms arnong farmers--whomay be poorer
than the nationalaverage,but wealthier than agriculturallaborersor rural nonfarn laborers. The
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benefitsof general goods, such as defense, police, and adniinistration,are typically allocatedas
if they are pro-poor when measured as a percentage of recipient income and favor urban
inhabitants.
For developingcountries,benefit incidencestudiesconcentrateheavilyon a few countries.
Few studieshave been done for countriesoutside of Central and South America--andwe are not
aware of any benefit incidence studies for Africar.countries. Given the scarcity of results and
the World Bank's continued interest in distributionalissues (e.g., Conable, 1990, p. 299), we
believe that further benefit incidenceresearch may yield laige benefits for policy makers. In
addition, while survey costs for some earlier studies were high, increasing availability of
household survey data may have substantiallylowered the costs of undertakingresearch in this
area (though in some cases minor modificationsof the survey instrumentsmay be required to
generate the required data).
To make sure this research is of greatest possible value to policy makers, we make a
number of recommendationson conductingbenefit incidenceanalyses. First, aggregateresults
based on the zero-governmentcounterfactualrely on very strong assumptionsabout fixedrelative
prices and incomes, government efficiency, and the relationship between marginal and total
benefits. Also, those studies are often not designedto identify which types of public services
benefit the poor. We believe that researchersshould focus more on providing benefit incidence
studies on specific government functions or programs that can help policy makers reach
conclusions about proposed reallocationsof resources among govemment programs. Second,
benefit incidenceshould be assigned to households based on household survey informationon
usage rather than on ad hoc assumptionsthat assign benefits based on income or the number of
members in the household. Third, improved annual cost measures for services need to be
developed, particularly with respect to capital inputs. Fourth, researchers should group
households by deciles and whenever possible should consider other groupings, including
household income adjusted for household composition,age, location, and other relevant socioeconomicvariables. Finally,careful attentionto life-cyclebenefits,benefit shifting,rent-seeking,
out-of-pocketcosts, displacementof private sectorefforts,averageversusmarginalincidence,and
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a number of other issues discussed above can significantly raise the value' of benefit incidence
studies to policy makers.
Of course, even if researchers adhere to these guidelines, benefit incidence analysis
remains an exercise in the allocation of government outlays rather than rigorous research into
welfare-based benefit measures. Thus, while we believe this literature is very infornative, we
also believe that it is desirable, whenever possible, to complement benefit incidence studies with
other forms of research. One direction for additional research is to estimate the full consumer
surpluses associated with policy reforms. Inportant work in this area includes the on-going
research efforts of the World Bank's Living Standards Measurement Survey. Another important
line of inquiry includes more "institutional" research into the details of service delivery that
thwart the utilization of programs targeted by lower-income households. Inportant examples of
this sort of research include Whittington et al., Meerman, Meesook, and Chemichovsky and
Meesook.
In addition to formal research efforts, project teams wil typically perform benefit
incidence analyses under severe time and financial constraints. How can more fonnal research
inform field work and mnissionsthat need reliable benefit incidence answers under more severe
time pressures? In general terms, the research findings suggest several focal points for short-term
missions.

First, compared to other countries at similar levels of development, does the

expenditure pattern for the country in question suggest a misallocation due to an unusual share
of GDP spent on general goods as opposed to social services? Second, with any social service,
do expenditures seem skewed towards the primary urban area relative to population living in the
secondary urban or rural areas, and are expenditures concentrated on services that studies reveal
benefit households in higher income deciles? Such concentrations of benefits suggest reforms,
such as reallocation of services to rural areas, and increasing user fees for the social services
consumed at higher income deciles. Costs recovered could then be allocated to services known
to benefit the poor. Third, studies that have examined the reasons for low participation of poorer
households in public services of interest to the mission can give the mission a head start in
identifying potential institutional barriers prevrwntingthe poor from consuming services. Armed
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with a set of potential problems in targeting benefits to the poor, missions can identify altemative
programs or specific short-term studies that could lead to more effective policy making.
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Endnotes
1.

For two reviews of the tax incidence literature, see Bird and DeWulf (1973), and Shah
and Whalley (1992).

2.

Recent theoretical analysis of targeting include Besley and Kanbur (1988), Besley and
Coate (1989), and Ravallion (1989).

3.

The incidence effects of government regulations are not examined by either tax, benefit,
or expenditure incidence analysis, and therefore constitute a fourth, and relatively
unexamined, area of incidence analysis (Willig and Bailey, 1981).

4.

There is some ambiguity in the terms pro-rich and pro-poor. Pro-rich means that benefits
from public goods are higher for households with higher incomes, while the opposite
holds when benefits have a pro-poor distribution. As discussed later, some research
examines benefits per household in measuring pro-rich or pro-poor, while other research
examines benefits as a percent of household income in measuring pro-rich or pro-poor.

5.

For an excellent example of what is possible in this regard, see Meerman (1979).

6.

An example of this approach that avoids double counting is Bahl et al. (1986). The
reasonableness of using interest payments as a proxy for capital services depends on the
country's borrowing practices, the rate of capital depreciation, and whether borrowing
exclusively finances public capital rather than current expenditure.

7.

Researchers have adjusted current income data in a variety of ways to account for the
problems that the use of current income introduces to the incidence analysis. For
exanple, to avoid nonsensical results in his United States tax burden estimnates,Pechman
(1985, pp. 77-80) eliminates from his data the 5 percent of households with the lowest
current income. The households are for the most part only temporarily in the low-income
group and have consumption and other variables that do not match-up with their reported
current income. Davies, St. Hilaire and Whalley (1984) examine lifetime incidence of
taxes for Canadian households. They find that both lifetime incidence and anmual
incidence analyses suggest a mildly progressive pattem for tax burden in Canada. But
income taxes are less progressive in lifetime than in annual incidence calculations. Other
taxes axe less regressive in their lifetime incidence than in their annual incidence. In
research discussed later in this paper, James and Benjamin (1987) analyze education
benefits correcting for deficiencies in current income measures of well-being.

8.

An exception is Burkhauser (1986) who examines the distribution of social security
benefits in Panama using the eaniing histories of beneficiaries. While cross-section
analysis based on current income suggests a pro-poor distribution, since most beneficiaries
had retired, many of these beneficiaries had relatively high eamings prior to retirement,
so that the distribution of benefits may, in fact, be pro-rich from a permanent income
perspective.

9.

Despite limitations on data to implement lifetime income and benefit incidence analysis,
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and Holtzmann (1989) demonstrate the problems with the
conventional single period analyses. While conventional analysis could be misleading,
Holtzmann also shows that lifetime benefit analyses are very sensitive to the assumptions
made about individuals' time preference, risk aversion and other parameters.

10.

Meerman (1979) is an excellent example of a study that examines benefits for a number

of socio-economicand geographicpartitions of an economy.
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11.

A number of recent refinements to the Gini measure have been proposed. Kienzle (1982)
and Bridges (1984) develop aggregate expenditure measures based on the tax incidence
measure developed by Suits (1977). Lambert and Pfahler (1988) modify the aggregate
expenditure approach to obtain measures that are invariant to equal additions to each
individual's tax payment and benefit from govemrnmentspending, drawing on the tax
progressivity analyses of Kakwani (1977).

12.

Linn (1980) reviews the findings on the distribution of local government expenditure
benefits and tax burdens for three cities in Colombia.

13.

In fact, Chaudry-Shah (1989, p. 373) states that he finds capitalization of a very small
portion of expenditures. For a review of capitalization as it applies to local public
fmance, see Chaudry-Shah (1988). For other analyses of hedonic pricing, see Follain and
Jimenez (1985), Kanemoto (1988), Kanemoto and Nakamura (1986), and Scotchmer
(1985).

14.

For evidence on the deficits of public enterprises, see Nair and Filippides, 1988.
Selowsky (1979, Chapter 5) provides a detailed methodology for calculating the subsidy
to users of public enterprise services, and Linn (1980) provides a helpful discussion of
alternative methods to calculate consumer subsidies from public enterprises.

15.

For examnple,Maddock and Castano (n.d.) data suggest that about 10 percent of electricity
is stolen in Medellin, Colombia. They suggest that much of the stolen electricity (though
not all) benefits poor households.

16.

Several papers have examined the valuation of benefits from in-kind goods (Olsen, 1972;
DeSalvo, 1975; Smeeding, 1984; and Olsen and York, 1984). For a theoretical discussion
of benefits with queuing costs, see Alderman (1987).

17.

Such effects occur in developed countries (e.g., Lampman and Smeeding, 1983), but may
be even more pronounced in developing countries. In fact, private transfers are an
important component of household income in developing countries examined in the
research papers reported in Rempel and Lobdell (1978) and Cox and Jimenez (1992).
Also, Knowles and Anker (1981) find significant transfers from young to old in Kenya,
while Butz and Stan (1982) discover similar results in Malaysia as do Ravallion and
Dearden (1988) in Java.

18.

While the urban-rural and industrial-agricultural distinctions do not exactly coincide, there
is often important overlap.

19.

One problem in this regard is that factor incomes already include subsidization, so that
subsidies must be netted out of factor income to obtain ex ante income (Meerman, p.
234).

20.

To our knowledge, more recent studies for developed countries do not exist. We
speculate that the lack of recent studies is parly due to theoretical objections to the
benefit incidence methodology, and pardy due to a shift in focus toward analysis of
individual programs or sets of programs.

21.

Public housing and health expenditures are in some cases classified as public goods.

22.

In a subsequent analysis, Meerman (1980) examines who "pays" for administrative
expenditures by calculating the difference between income and after-tax income adjusted
for specific government benefits. He finds that higher income groups overwhelmingly
pay for "social overhead" expenditures.
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23.

Meermnanpresents the results as expenditure benefits per household in each decile as a
percentage of average household per capita income for all households in the sample.
Thus, he has sirnply normalized total benefits or divided total benefit per household by
a constant (average household income). Thus, the distribution of benefits is on a total
basis rather than as a percentage of income.

24.

For instance, Meerman finds that out-of-pocket costs, such as uniforns, shoes, lunch,
transportation, books and supplies, amount to 13 percent of household income in the first
income quintile and 11 percent of household income in the second income quintile.

25.

Obviously there are a wide range of policy altematives and we do not pretend to
summarize them here. For a good summary of the policy options see Psacharopoulos,
Tan and Jimenez (1986), Jimenez (1986), (1987) and (1989), and Mingat and Tan (1985),
(1986a), and (1986b). For a detailed discussion of the role of education in development,
see Psacharopoulos and Woodhall (1985) and Tan and Mingat (1989). Psacharopoulos
(1985) also examines the return to education.

26.

TeclnicaLly, if one adopts a merit goods perspective, the relevant question is not how
government health benefits affect the post-fisc income distribution, but instead how such
benefits affect the post-fisc distribution of health or health care (Foxley, 1979, pp. 106110).

27.

Of course, average cost may be a poor proxy for marginal benefit. For example, if
marginal cost equals average cost, user fees set below marginal cost suggest that
individuals will utilize care until marginal benefit is below marginal and average cost.
There may also be an insurance value associated with health care, which is not
represented in the average cost measure of health care benefits.

28.

However, note that higher fees paid by the rich are often associated with higher quality
of care, so that studies using average cost per visit should probably use average fee per
visit in calculating household benefits (Meerman, pp. 159-160). Also, see Selowsky (p.
81) for the appropriate treatment of premium contributions to public health care plans.

29.

Unfortunately Meesook's data do not pennit her to distinguish between govemment and
private hospital care. Nevertheless, even if all private care were consumed by the well-todo, the distribution of public hospital subsidies would still be pro-rich overall.

30.

Of course, excessive migration to urban areas can also cause crowding, unemployment,
poverty-stricken squatter colonies, and civic unrest (Williamson, 1988, surveys this
literature).

31.

For instance, Meennan allocates land settlement costs to resettled farmers, and Foxley et
al. allocate agricultural credit to medium and large farmers.

32.

When survey data on utilization exist but there are no corresponding data on program
costs, researchers might folow Meerman and Selowsky, both of whom derive useful
insights from utilization data alone.

33.

That is, it can be argued that forward shifting to consumers of agricultural benefits in
developing countries does not exist when the govenment acts to maintain a fixed
consumer price (e.g., Meerman, p. 234). In this case, however, there are really two
government actions, an agricultural program and a price program, so that one should
explicitly examine the incidence effects of both.
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34.

Other related studies include Alderman and von Braun (1985), Pinstrup-Andersonand
Alderman(1987), and Behrmanand Deolaikar (1990).

47
References
Aaron, Henry and Martin McGuire. "Public Goods and Income Distribution," Econometrica,
v. 38 (1970) pp. 907-920.
Alderman, Harold. "Allocation of Goods Through Non-Price Mechanisms: Evidence on
Distribution by Willigness to Wait," Journal of Development Economics,
v. 25 (1987)
pp. 105-124.
Alderman, Harold, and 3.von Braun. "Egypt: Implicatiors of Alternative Food Subsidy Policies
in the 1980s," mimeo (1985) Washington, D. C.: Intemational Food Policy Research
Institute.
Allen, Franklin. "Optimal Linear Income Taxation with General Equilibrium Effects on Wages,"
Journal of Public Economics, v. 17 (1982) pp. 135-143.
Altaf, Mir Anjum, Haroon Jamal, Jin Long Liu, V. Kerry Smith and Dale Whittington. "Who
Connects to Public Water Systems in Developing Countries: A Case Study of Punjab,
Pakistan," The World Bank, Policy, Planning and Research Staff, Infrastructure and urban
Development Department, Discussion Paper (September 1989).
Andreoni, James. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Publ' . Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow
Giving," Economic Journal, v. 100 (1990) pp. 464-477.
Auerbach, Alan and Lawrence Kotlikoff, Dynamic Fiscal Policy (Cambridge: Caambridge
University Press, 1987).
Bahl, Roy, Chuk Kyo Kim and Chong Lee Park. Public Finances During the Korean
Modernization
Process (Camnbridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).
Barro, Robert. "Are Govenmnent Bonds Net Wealth?" Journal of Political Economy, v. 82 (1974)
pp. 1095-1119.
_____.

The Impactof Social Security on Private Saving: Evidence from the U. S. Time Series
(Washington, D. C: American Enterprise Institute, 1978).

Behmian, Jere R., and Anii B. Deolaikar. "The Poor and the Social Sectors During a Period of
Macroeconomic Adjustment: Empirical Evidence for Jamaica," (1990) Research Paper
No. 152, Departnent of Economics, Willias College.
Bell, Clive. "Credit Markets and Interlinked Transactions," in Hollis Chenery and T. N.
Srinivassan, eds., The Handbook of Development Economics, v. 1. (Amsterdam: North
Holland, 1988).
Besley, Timothy J., and Stephen Coate. "Universal Public Provision of Private Goods and the
Redistribution of Income," mimeo, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, 1989.
Besley, TimnothyJ., and S.M. Ravi Kanbur. "Food Subsidies and Poverty Alleviation," Economic
Journal, v. 98 (1988) pp. 701-719.

Bhaduri, Amit. The Economic Structure of Backward Agriculture (London: Academic Press,
1983).

48

Bird, Richard M., and Luc De Wulf. "Taxation and Income Distributiorl in Latin America: A
Critical Review of the Empirical Literature," International MonietaryFund Staff Papers,
v. 20 (1973) pp. 1151-1161.
Bravenian, Avishay, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. "Landlords, Tenants -andTechnological minovations,"
Journal of DevelopmentEconomics,v. 23 (1986) pp. 3 13-32.
Bridges, Benjamin Jr. "Post-Fisc Distributions of Income: Commnent,"Public Finance Quarterly,
v. 12 (1984) pp. 231-240.
Burkhauser, Richard V. "Social Security in Panamna: A Multiperiod Analysis of Income
Distribution," Journal of Development Economics, v. 21 (1986) pp. 53-64.
Butz, WWliamP. and Peter J.E. Stan. "Household Composition and Interhousehold Exchange in
Malaysia," Popuilationand Development Review, v. 8 (March 1982) pp. 92-115.
Casteneda, Tarsicio. "Innovative Social Policies for Reducing Poverty: Chile in the 1980s,"
mimneo(World Bank, 1989).
Chaudry-Shah, Anwer, M. "Capitalization and the Thbeory of Local Public Finance:
Interpretive Essay," Journal of Economic Surveys, v. 2 (1988) pp. 209-24.
_______

An

"A Capitalization Approach to Fiscal Incidence at the Local Level," Land Economics,
v. 65 (1989) pp. 359-375.

Chemnichovsky,Dov and Oey A. Meesook. "School Enrollment in Indonesia," World Bank Staff
Working Papers, Number 746, 1985.
Conable, Barber. "Speech to the Forty-Fifth Annual Meetings of the IntemnationalMonetary
Fund and the World Bank," September 26, 1990, cited in the IMF Survey, October 26,
1990, p. 299.
Cox, Donald, and Emmanuel Jimenez, "Private Transfers and Public Transfers in Developing
Countries: A Case of Peru," Tlte World Bank Economic Review, v. 6(1992) pp. 155-169.
Denzau, Anuther and R. MacKay, "Beniefit Shares and Majority Voting," American Economic
Review, v. 66 (1976) pp. 405-407.
Dasgupta, Ajit K., and Janhyala B. G. Tilak. "Distribution Among Income Groups: An
Empirical Analysis," Economnic and Political Weekdy, v. 18 (August 13, 1983)
pp. 1442-1447.
Davies, James, France St-Hilaire and John Whalley. "Some Calculations of Lifetime Tax
Incidence," American Economic Review, v. 74 (1984) pp. 633-649.
de Ferranti, David. "Paying for Health Services in Developing Countries: An Overview," World
Bank Staff Working Papers, No. 721, 1985.
De Salvo, Joseph S. "Benefits and Costs of-New York City's Middle-Income Housing Program,"
Journal of Political Economy, v. 83 (1975) pp. 791-806.
De Wulf, Luc. "Fiscal Incidence Studies in Developing Countries," International Monetary Fund
Staff Papers, v. 22 (1975) pp. 61-131.

49
"Incidence of Budgetary Outlays: Where Do We Go From Here?" Public Finalnce,

v. 36 (1981)pp. 55-76.

Fei, John C. H., and Gustav Ranis. Developmentof the Surplus Labor Economy (Homewood
Illinois: Richmond and Irwin, 1964).
Fitzgerald,E.V.K. "Land Reform," in John Eatwellet al., eds., The New Palgrave: Economic
Development (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987).
Follain, J.R., and E. Jirnenez. "Estimatingthe Demand for Housing Characteristics: A Survey
and Critique,"Regional Scienceand UrbanEconomics,v. 15 (1985)pp. 77-107.
Foxley, Alejandro.RedistributiveEffects of GovernmentProgrammes: The Chilean Case, in
collaborationwith EduardoAninat and J. P. Arellano (Oxford: PergamonPress, 1979).
Fryer, Michelle L. "Females as Beneficiaries of Bank Operations in Africa," Education and
Training Department,World Bank (Washington,DC, 1986).
Gertler, Paul, and Paul Glewwe. "The Willingness to Pay for Education in Developing
Countries,"Living Standards MeasurementStudy Working Paper No. 54 (Washington,
DC: The World Bank, 1989).
Gertler, Paul, Luis Locay, Warren Sanderson. "Are User Fees Regressive? The Welfare
Implications of Health Care Financing Proposals in Peru," part I of "Health Care
Financing and the Demand for Medical Care," Living Standards Measurement Study
Working Paper, No. 37 (Washington,DC: The World Bank, 1988).
Gertler, Paul and Jaques van der Gaag. "Measuringthe Willingnessto Pay for Social Services
in DevelopingCountries,"Living StandardsMeasurementStudy Working Paper No. 45
(Washington,DC: The World Bank, 1988).
Gillespie,W. Irwin. "Effect of Public Expenditureson the Distributionof Income," in Richard
Musgrave (ed.), Essays in Fiscal Federalism (Washington, DC: The Brookings
Insitution, 1965).
Govenmient of Hungary.IncidenceAnalysis: The Impact of Consumerand Housing Subsidies
on HouseholdIncome Distribution (Budapest,September 1989).
Griffin, CharlesC. "HealthFinancingin Asia," mimeo, Departmentof Economics,Universityof
Oregon, 1990.
Grosh, MargaretE. "The Jatnaican Food Stanps Program,"mineo, World Bank, 1990.
Gruske, Karl-Dieter."RedistributiveEffects of the IntegratedFinancial and Social Budgets in
West Germany,"in PublicFinanceand Social Policy,Proceedingsof the 39th Conference
of the IntemationalInstituteof Public Finance (Detroit: Wayne State UniversityPress,
1985).
Hanuner, Jeffrey S., Ijaz Nabi and JamnesA. Cerone. "DistributionalImpact of Social Sector
Expendituresin Malaysia." World Bank Conferenceon PublicExpendituresand the Poor
Incidence and Targeting,June 1992.
Hanunes,David L., and DouglasT. Wills. "Public Debt, Interest and Fiscal Incidence,"Review
of Income and Wealth,v. 33 (1987) pp. 439-44.

50

Herriot, Roger A., and Herman P. Miller. "Tax Changes among Income Groups-1962-68,"
Business Horizons, 1972, pp. 41-50.
Hertel, Thomas W. "Applied General EquilibriumAnalysis of Agricultural Policies," mimeo,
Purdue University, 1989.
Hewitt, Daniel P. "The Benefit Incidence of Consumption Public Goods," Public Finance
Quarterly, v. 15 (1987) pp. 138-165.
Hochman,Harold, and James Rodgers. "Pareto Optimal Redistribution,"American Economic
Review, v. 59 (1969) pp. 542-57.
Holzmann,Robert. "The Welfare Effect of Public ExpenditureProgramsReconsidered,"IMF
Working Paper 89/62, Fiscal Affairs Department(August2, 1989).
Jallade, Jean-Pierre. Public Expenditureson Educationand InicomeDistribution in Colombia,
World Bank Occasionalpaper No. 18 (1974).
James, Estelle and Gail Beniamin. "EducationalDistributionand Income Redistributionthrough
Educationin Japan,' Journal of Human Resources,v. 22 (1987): 469-489.
Jimenez, Emmanuel. "The Public Subsidization of Education and Health in Developing
Countries: A Review of Equity and Efficiency," The Research Observer (1986)
pp. 111-129.
Pricing Policy in tlte Social Sectors (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1987).
_____

"Social Sector Policy Revisited:

A Survey of Some Recent Controversies,"

Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics 1989
(1989) pp. 109-138.
Kakwani, N. C. "Applicationsof Lorenz Curves in EconomicAnalysis,"Econometrica,v. 45
(1977) pp. 719-727.
Kanemoto, Yoshitsugu. "Hedonic Prices and the Benefits of Public Projects," Econometrica,
v. 56 (1988) pp. 981-989.
Kanemoto, Yoshitsugu, and Ryohei Nakatnura. 'A New Approach to the Esdtmationof
Structural Equations in Hedonic Models," Journal of Urban Economics, v. 19 (1986),
pp. 218-233.
Kienzle, Edward C. "Post-Fisc Distributions of Income: Measuring Progressivity with
Application to the United States," Public Finance Quarterly, v. 10 (1982) pp. 355-368.
Knowles,J.C., and RichardAnker. "An Analysisof IncomeTransfersin a DevelopingCountry,"
Journal of DevelopmentEconomics,v. 8 (April 1981)pp. 205-226.
Lambert, Peter J., and Wilhelm Pfahler. "On Aggregate Measures of the Net Redistributive
Impact of Taxationand GovenmnentExpenditure,"PublicFinanceQuarterly,v. 16 (1988)
pp. 178-202.
Lampman, Robert J., and Timothy M. Smeeding. "InterfamilyTransfers as Alternatives to
GovenmuentTransfersto Persons,"Review of Incomeand Wealth,s. 29 (1983)pp. 45-66.

51
Laraki, Kanm. "Food Subsidies: A Case Study of Price Reform in Morocco," Living Standards
Measurement Study Working Paper No. 50 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1989).
Lee, K.H., and Jee-Peng Tan. "The International Flow of Third Level LDC Students to DCs:
Detenrinants and Inplications," Higher Education, v. 13 (1984) pp. 687-690.
LeGrand, Julian. "The Distribution of Public Expenditure:
Economica, v. 45 (1978) pp. 125-142.
_____.

The Case of Health Care,"

"MThe
Distribution of Public Expenditure on Education," Economica, v. 49 (1982)
pp. 63-68.

Leu, Robert E., Rene L. Frey, and Brigitte Buhmann. "Taxes, Expenditures, and Income
Distribution in Switzerland," Journal of Social Policy, v. 14 (1985) pp. 341-360.
Lewis, W. A. "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor," Manchester School,
v. 22 (1954) pp. 139-191.
Linn, Johannes. "The Distributive Effects of Local Govemment Finances in Colombia." in R.
Albert Berry and Ronald Soligo, Economic Policy and Income Distribution in Colombia
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980).
Maddock, Rodney, and Elkin Castano. "Redistributing Income Through Public Utility Prices:
Electricity in Columbia," Manuscript La Trobe University, Bundoora Australia, no date.
Maital, Shlomo. "Public Goods and Income Distribution: Some Further Results," Econometrica,
v. 41 (1973) pp. 561-568.
-

. "Apportionment of Public Goods Benefits to Individuals," Public Finance, v. 30 (1975)
pp. 397416.

Martinez-Vasquez, Jurge. "Fiscal Incidence at the Local Level," Econometrica, v. 50 (1982)
pp. 1207-1218.
McLure, Charles E. "On the Theory and Methodology of Estimating Benefit and Expenditure
Incidence," mimeo, Wodkshop on Income Distribution, Rice University, 1974.
McLure, Charles E. and Wayne R. Thirsk. "A SimnplifiedExposition of the Harberger Model, II:
Expenditure Incidence," National Tax Journal, v. 28 (1975) pp. 195-207.
McNarnara, Robert. "Annual Address," in Annual Meetings of the Borirds of Governors, Sumnmary
Proceedings, Intemational Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International
Finance Corporation, and Intemational Development Association (Washington, D. C:
World Bank, 1972).

Meerman,Jacob. PublicExpenditurein Malaysia: Who Benefitsand Why? (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1979).
. "Are Public Goods Public Goods?" Public Choice, v. 35 (1980) pp. 45-57.
Meesook, Oey A. "Financing and Equity in the Social Sectors in Indonesia," World Bank Staff
Working Papers, Number 703, 1984.

Meldau, Elke C. Benefit Incidence: Public Health Expendituresand the Income Distribution
(North Quimby, MA: Christopher Publishing House, 1980).

52
Mingat, Alain, and Jee-Peng Tan. "Subsidization of Higher Education versus Expansion of
Primary Enrollments: What Can a Shift in Resources Achieve in Sub-Saharan Africa?"

InternationalJournal of EducationalDevelopment,v. 5 (1985) pp. 259-268.
. "Who Profits from the Public Funding of Education? A Comparison of World
Regions," Comparative Education Review, v. 30 (1986a) pp. 260-270.
. "Expanding Education through User Charges: What Can be Achieved in Malawi and
Other LDC's?" Economics of Education Review, v. 5 (1986b) pp. 273-286.
Mohammed, Sharif, and John Whalley. "Rent Seeking in Idia:
Significance," Kyklos, v. 37 (1984) pp. 387-413.

Its Costs and Policy

Musgrave, Richard A. The Theory of Public Finance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959).
Musgrave, Richard A., Karl E. Case, and Hennan Leonard "The Distribution of Fiscal Burdens
and Benefits," Public Finance Quarterly, v. 2 (1974) pp. 259-311.
Nair, Govindan and Anastasios Filippides. How Much Do State-Owned Enterprises Contribute

to Public Sector Deficits in DevelopingCountries-and Why? BackgroundPaper for the
World Development Report (The World Bank, WPS 45, December 1988). .
O'Higgins, Michael and Patricia Ruggles. "The Distribution of Public Expenditures and Taxes
among Households in the United Kingdom," Review of Income and Wealth, s. 27 (198 la)
pp. 298-326.
O'Higgins, Michael and Patricia Ruggles. "The Distribution of Public Expenditures among
Households in the United States," Review of Income and Wealth, s. 27 (198 lb):137-164.
Oleen, Edgar 0. "An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control," Journal of Political Economy,
v. 80 (1972) pp. 1081-1100.
Olsen, Edgar O., and Kathy A. York. ~'TheEffect of Different Measurs of Benefit on Estimates
of the Distributive Consequences of Govenment Programs," in Marilyn Moon, ed.,
Economic Transfers in the United States (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1984).
Parikh, Kirit, and T. N. Srinivasan. "Poverty Alleviation Policies in India: Food Consumption
Subsidy, Food Production Subsidy and Employment Generation," mimeo, Yale University,
1989.
Pechman, Joseph A. "Note on the Intergenerational Transfer of Public Higher Education
Benefits," Journal of Political Economy, v. 80 (1972) pp. 256-59.

who Paid the Taxes, 1966-85? (Washington, DC. Brookings Institution, 1985).
W
Petrei, A. Humberto. "El Gasto Publico Social y sus Effectos Distributivos," Programa ECIEL
(Rio de Janiero, 1987).
Philpotts, Geofrey. "Public Good Benefit Attribution," Public Finance Quarterly, v. 14 (1986)
pp. 313-328.
Piggott, John, and John Whalley. "Interpreting Net Fiscal Incidence Calculations," Review of
Economics and Statistics, v. 69 (1987) pp. 685-694.

53
Pinstrup-Anderson, Per, and Harold Aldermnan."The Effectiveness of Consumer-Oriented Food
Subsidies in Reaching Rationing and Incomes Transfer Goals," in Per Pinstrup-Anderson,
ed., Consumer-Oriented Food Subsidies: Benefits, Costs, and Policy Options (1986)
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Psacharopoulos, George. "The Perverse Effects of Public Subsidization of Education or How
Equitable is Free Education?" Compatative Education Review, v. 25 (1977) pp. 69-90.
_______.

"Retums to Education: A Further International Update and Implications," Journal of
Human Resources, v. 20 (Fall 1985) pp. 584-604.

Psacharopoulos, George, Jee-Peng Tan, and Emmanuel Jimenez. Financing Education in
Developing Countries: An Exploration of Policy Options (Washington, DC: World Bank,
1986).
Psacharopoulos, George and Maureen Woodhall. Education for Development: An Analysis of
Investment Choices (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
Ravallion, Martin. "Land Contingent Poverty Alleviation Schemes," World Development, v. 17
(1989) pp. 1223-1233.
Ravallion, Martin, and Lorraine Dearden. "Social Security in a 'Morale' Economy: An
Empirical Analysis for Java," Review of Economics and Statistics, v. 70 (1988) pp. 36-44.
Rempel, Henry, and Richard A. Lobdell. "The Role of Urban-to-Rural Remittances in
Developing Countries," Journal of Development Studies, v. 14 (1978) pp. 324-41.
Reynolds, Morgan, and Eugene Smolensky. Public Expenditures, Taxes, and the Distribution of
Income: The United States, 1950, 1961, and 1970 (New York: Academic Press, 1977).
Riboud, Michelle. "Costa Rica: Public Sector Social Spending," mimeo, The World Bank, 1990.
Ross, Thomas W. "On the Relative Efficiency of Cash Transfers and Subsidies," Working Paper
E-88-20, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1988.
Rowley, Charles K., Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock. The Political Economy of RentSeeking (Norwall, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988).
Sah, Raj Kumar, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. "The Taxation and Pricing of Agricultural and Industrial
Goods in Developing Economies," in David Newberry and Nicholas Stem (eds.), The
Theory of Taxation for Developing Countries (New York: Oxford University Press,
1987).
Sahota, Gian S. "The Distribution of the Benefits of Public Expenditure in Panama," Public
Finance Quarterly, v. 5 (1977) pp. 203-230.
Sauma, Pablo, and Juan Diego Trejos. "Evoluti6n reciente de la Distribuci6n de Ingreso en
Costa Rica (1977-1986)," mirneo, Instituto de Investigaciones en Ciencias Econ6micas,
University of Costa Rica (San Jose) (1990).
Scotchmer, Suzanne. "Hedonic Prices and Cost/Benefit Analysis," Journal of Economic Theorv,
v. 37 (1985) pp. 55-75.

54
Selden, Thomas and Michael Wasylenko. "Measuring the Distributional Effects of Public
Education in Peru." Prepared for the World Bank Conference on Public Expenditure and
the Poor: Incidence and Targeting, June 17-19, 1992.
Selowsky, Marcelo. Who Benefits from Government Expenditure? (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1979).
Shah, Anwar, and John Whalley. "Tax Incidence Analysis of Developing Countries:
Alternative View," The World Bantk Economic Review, v. 5 (1991) pp. 535-552.

An

Smeeding, Timothy M. "Approaches to Measuring and Valuing In-Kind Subsidies and the
Distribution of Their Benefits," in Marilyn Moon, ed., Economic Transfers in the United
States (Chicago: The University of Clhicago Press, 1984).
Smolensky, Eugene, William Hoyt, and Sheldon Danzinger. "A Critical Survey of Efforts to
Measure Budget Incidence," pp. 165-179 in The Relevance of Public Finance for PolicyMaking, Proceedings of the 41st Conference of the Intemational Institute of Public
Finance (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987).
Suits, David P. "Measurement of Tax Progressivity," American Economic Review, v. 67 (1977)
pp. 747-752.
Tan, J.P. and Alain Mingat. "Educational Development in Asia: A Comparative Study Focussing
on Cost and Financing Issues," Internal Discussion Paper, Asia Regional Series, The
World Bank (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989).
Tax Foundation, Inc. Tax Burdens and Beniefits of Government Expenditures by Income Class,
1961 and 1965 (New York, 1967).
Todaro, Michael P. "A Model of Labor, Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Developed
Countries," American Economic Review, v. 59 (1969), pp. 138-148.
van de Walle, Dominique. 'The Distribution of the Benefits from Social Services in 'adonesia,
1978-1987," Policy Research Working Papers, Public Economics, Country Economics
Department, The World Bank, March 1992, WPS 871.
van der Gaag, Jacques, and Eugene Smolensky. "True Household Equivalence Scales and
Characteristics of the Poor in the United States," Review of Income and Wealth, s. 28
(1982) Pp. 17-27.
Whittington, Dale, Donald T. Lauria and Xinming Mu. "Paying for Urban Services: A Study
of Water Vending and Willingness to Pay for Water in Onitsha, Nigeria," The World
Bank, Policy, Planning and Research Staff, Infrastructure and Urban Development
Department, Case Study (March 1989).
Whittington, Dale, Apia Okorafor, Augustine Okore and Alexander McPhail. "Strategy for Cost
Recovery in the Rural Water Sector A Case Study of Nsukka District, Anambra State,
Nigeria," The World Bank, Policy, Planning and Research Staff, Infrastructure and Urban
Development Departnent, Draft Report (August 1989).
Williamson, Jeffrey G. "Migration and Urbanization," in Hollis Chenery and T. N. Srinivassan,
eds., The Handbook of Development Economics, v. 1. (Amsterdam: North Holland. 1988).

55
WilWig,R.D., and E.E. Bailey. "Income Distribution Concerns in Regulatory Policy Making," in
G. Fromm (ed.), Studies in Public Regulation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1981).
World Bank. World Development Report (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1990).
Yinger, John M. "Capitalization and the Theory of Local Public Finance," Journal of Political
Economy, v. 90 (1982) pp. 917-943.

Policy Research Working Paper Series
Title

Author

Date

Contact
for paper

WPS992 RegionalIntegrationin Sub-Saharan FaezehForoutan
Africa: Experienceand Prospects

October 1992

S. Fallon
37947

WPS993 An EconomicAnalysisof Capital
Flightfrom Nigeria

October 1992

N. Lopez
34555

October 199;

A. Daruwala
33713

S. Ibi Ajayi

WPS994 Textilesand Apparelin NAFTA:
Geoffrey Bannister
A Caseof ConstrainedLiberalization Patrick Low

WPS995 Recent Experiencewith Commercial Stijn Claessens
October 1992
BankDebt Reduction
IshacDiwan
EduardoFernandez-Arias

RoseVo
33722

WPS996 StrategicManagementof Population MichaelH. Bernhart
Programs

October 1992

0. Nadora
31091

WPS997 HowFinancialUberalizationin
John R. Harris
IndonesiaAffected Firms'Capital
FabioSchiantarelli
Structure and InvestmentDecisions MirandaG. Siregar

October 1992

W. Pitayatonakarn
37664

WPS998 What DeterminesDemandfor Freight Esra Bennathan
Transport?
Julie Fraser
LouisS. Thompson

October 1992

B. Gregory
33744

WPS999 StoppingThree Big Inflations
(Argentina,Brazil,and Peru)

MiguelA. Kiguel
Nissan Liviatan

October1992

R. Luz
34303

WPS1000Why StructuralAdjustmentHas Not
Succeededin Sub-SaharanAfrica

IbrahimA. Elbadawi
DhaneshwarGhura
GilbertUwujaren

October 1992

A. Maranon
39074

WPS1001 HaveWorld Bank-Supported
IbrahimA. Elbadawi
AdjustmentProgramsImprovedEconomic
Performancein Sub-SaharanAfrica?

October 1992

A. Maranon
39074

WPS1002 WorldFossilFuel Subsidiesand
GlobalCarbonEmissions

Bjorn Larsen
AnwarShah

October 1992

WDROffice
31393

WPS1003 Rent-Sharingin the Multi-Fibre
Arrangement:Evidencefrom U.S.HongKongTradeinApparel

KalaKrishna
LingHuiTan

October 1992

M. T. Sanchez
33731

WPS1004FamilyPlanningProgramsin SubSaharanAfrica:Case Studiesfrom
Ghana,Rwanda,and the Sudan

ReginaMicNamara
ThereseMcGinn
DonaldLauro
John Ross

October 1992

0. Nadora
31091

WPS1005 An Approachto the Economic
Analysisof Water Supply Projects

Laszio Lovel

October 1992

M. Dhokal
33970

Policy Research Working Paper Serles
Title

Author

Date

Contact
for paper

October1992

A. Tumer
30933

October1992

0. Nadora
31091

of HaroldAlderman
WPS1008Dothe PoorInsure?A Synthesis
onRiskand
ChristinaH. Paxson
the LRterature
Consumption
in Developing
Countries

October1992

C. Spooner
32116

WPS1009LaborandWomen'sNutrition:
PaulA. Higgins
HaroldAlderman
A Studyof EnergyExpenditure,
Statusin Ghana
Fertility,andNutritional

October1992

C.Spooner
32116

October1992

W. Pitayatonakarn
37664

AffectDecisionsRobinBoadway
MPS10.1HowTax Incentives
Countries AnwarShah
to Investin Developing

1992
November

C. Jones
37754

WPS1012 TheBradyPlan,the 1989Mexican HalukUnal
Agreement,
andBankAsliDemirgOg-Kunt
DebtReduction
StockReturnsin the UnitedStates Kwok-Wai
Leung
andJapan

November
1992

W. Patrawimolpon
37664

WPS1013TheImpactof Mexico'sRetraining AnaRevenga
on Employment
andWages MichelleRiboud
Program
HongTan

November
1992

D.Young
30932

and Earnings GeorgePsacharopoulos November
1992
WPs1014Ethnicity,Education,
in BoliviaandGuatemala

L.Longo
39244

1992
November

C. Jones
37754

JorgeM.Rebelo
Multiyear
Railway
WPS1006Preparing
Plans:A Market-Oriented
Investment
Approach
WPS1007GlobalEstimatesandProjections
of Mortalityby Cause,1970-2015

andEfficiencyin
WPS1010Competition
Hungarian
Banking

WPS1015BenefitIncidenceAnalysisin
Countries
Developing

Rodotfo
A. Bulatao
PatienceW. Stephens

DimitriVittas
CraigNeal

ThomasM.Selden
MichaelJ. Wasylenko

